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WHY FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT AND
WHY ANIMALS SHOULD HAVE IT
MARTHA NUSSBAUMt
Well, thank you Dean Smith. I especially want to thank the students
and Gabs Baker for all the great arrangements and the warm hospitality.
And thank you all for being here. So as the dean says, I have been mainly
occupied with developing this capabilities approach and am now in the
process of writing a book about the capabilities approach and animal
rights. But there's another angle that I've worked on as a philosopher, and
that is on the British Utilitarians. I have been in the process of writing a
book on them for a long period of time. I think that you all may think of
Utilitarianism as a cold, heartless, economistic philosophy, but the British
Utilitarians were actually radicals in many areas: women's rights, gay
rights, and, above all, animal rights. I believe John Stuart Mill is a fore-
runner of the capabilities approach.
So I want to talk about that relationship. Now, there's an obvious
point where we need to start. No one thinks that freedom of speech is lim-
ited to language use, even in today's law. It's long been established that
symbolic expression, such as flag burning, is a form of speech. So the
scene is set for an extension of speech rights to animals, and I think we
should ultimately be taking that step.
The theory of free speech rights was really founded by John Stuart
Mill, the great British philosopher and activist. On Liberty is the central
source for modern arguments regarding why free speech is important.' But
Mill (1806-1873) was also a radical and a strong defender of animal rights
who left all of his money when he died to the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals.2 Let's investigate that connection. I want to first
look at his mentor and teacher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Next, I
want to examine Mill's views about animals and their entitlements under
law. Finally, I want to turn to On Liberty and see why those arguments
can't really stop at the species barrier. I will claim that Mill's arguments
are applicable and that he knew the connection full well, although he did
not make that connection explicitly in On Liberty. Then, I will make a few
tentative remarks about how the speech theory of On Liberty can be ex-
tended to animal law.
t Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the Law and Philosophy
Department of the University of Chicago.
1. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1859).
2. See JOHN STUART MILL, WILLS AND DEED OF GIFT (1872), reprinted in MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS BY JOHN STUART MILLS 333 (John M. Robson ed., 1989).
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Now, first a word about the British Utilitarians. In general, they were
radical outsiders. They couldn't hold academic posts because they were
atheists, and you couldn't hold an academic post in Britain at that time
unless you were an Anglican. British Utilitarians were outsiders and radi-
cal opponents of Christian social convention that privileged elites and mar-
ginalized oppressed groups. They were also strong advocates of women's
rights. Bentham writes about this and Mill was very involved in this from
his youth onward. Mill went to jail when he was a young man for distrib-
uting contraceptive information to people in London. And later as a mem-
ber of Parliament, he introduced the first ever resolution in Britain (there
were some earlier resolutions in the United States) for women's suffrage.
All of them were defenders, in some ways, of greater political rights for
lesbians and gay men. Bentham is the most explicit on that. Although his
writings on that topic could not even be published in his own lifetime, the
Bentham Project at the University of London published them in 2013.
British Utilitarians were especially radicals about animals. Why was
that so? Well, the linchpin of their radicalism was the idea that we must
return to the body-pleasures and pains of the body-and we must see the
body as the central site of ethical value. The two main types of ethical
value are pleasure and pain. They are the same for all rather than some
pleasures that are higher and others that are lower. Therefore, the goal of
a rational society is to support pleasures and maximize the net balance of
pleasure over pain, not just for human beings but for all creatures. Even
Henry Sidgwick, who was a little bit later (183 8-1900) and was the most
conservative of the British Utilitarians, gestures in this direction. Alt-
hough, again, he couldn't be fully explicit in his lifetime.
Now, Bentham explicitly applied these ideas to animals. There is a
famous footnote in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Leg-
islation in which he talks about animals:
Under the Gentoo and Mahometan religions, the interests of the rest of
the animal creation seem to have met with some attention. Why have
they not universally, with as much as those of human creatures, allow-
ance made for the difference in point of sensibility? Because the laws
that are have been the work of mutual fear; a sentiment which the less
rational animals have not had the same means as man has of turning to
account. Why ought they not? No reason can be given. If the being
eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to
eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are
never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations
of future misery which we have. The death they suffer in our hands
commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less
painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course
of nature. If the being killed were all, there is very good reason why
we should be suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse
3. See About the Bentham Project, U.C. LONDON, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-pro-
ject/about-bentham-project (last visited July 23, 2018).
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for their living, and they are never the worse for being dead. But is
there any reason why we should be suffered to torment them? Not any
that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment
them? Yes, several. See B. I. tit. [Cruelty to animals]. The day has
been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the
greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been
treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for
example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come,
when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which
never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyr-
anny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the
skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without
redress to the caprice of a tormentor.* It may come one day to be rec-
ognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the
termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for aban-
doning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the
faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond compar-
ison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case
were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they rea-
son? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
* See Lewis XIV's Code Noir.
4
Most people know the famous part of the footnote, where he talks
about the importance of asking not "can they reason?" but "can they suf-
fer?" But I think the beginning part is equally as interesting. People usually
don't quote this beginning part. He recognizes that other civilizations,
namely Hindu and Islamic civilizations, have taken animal interests into
account when establishing the law. He then says that European civiliza-
tions have not taken animal interests into account because European laws
have been the work of mutual fear. In other words, and Mill agrees, people
make laws to prevent themselves from being harmed. Law is an instrument
of self-protection-a sentiment which the less rational animals have not
had the same means to turn to as man does. In other words, it's just the
fact that animals haven't had the power of putting what they fear into the
law. Their voices have not been heard when law is made. In other writings,
some of which are still unpublished, Bentham drew out the consequences
of this for the law. There should be outlawing of hunting and fishing for
sport. There should be a ban on other cruel practices, such as any cruel
practice of raising animals for meat. Bentham's own life showed that he
was a friend of animals. He loved to befriend them, even the mice who
were in his study. There are anecdotes about him embracing the mice who
ran across his lap and taking walks with a companion pig who lived around
him. So he lived with animals as a companion.
4. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
310 n.122 (Oxford Univ. Press 1879) (1789).
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In contrast to Bentham, Mill was not a total outsider: eventually he
became a member of Parliament. He explicitly and forcefully defends Ben-
tham's views on animals in an important but very neglected article called,
Whewell and Moral Philosophy (1852).5 William Whewell was a con-
servative Christian cleric and a very influential thinker. He was master of
Trinity College. Whewell attacked Bentham for a range of Bentham's rad-
ical positions. Mill replies to these attacks with scathing wit in a lengthy
journal article.6 The Bentham passage I quoted is quoted in full by Mill in
that article, and he refutes Whewell's arguments on a number of points.7
Among other things, he shows that Whewell's arguments against di-
vorce-that nothing should be terminated once you enter into a contract-
would have the consequence of making members of Parliament irremova-
ble and of prohibiting people from changing their profession. Mill is mak-
ing fun of Whewell by drawing out the real consequences of his argu-
ments. He then draws particular attention to Whewell's mockery of Ben-
tham's stance towards animal rights.8 Whewell clearly thought it was a
reductio ad absurdum of Bentham's views that they would require us to
consider the pleasures and pains of animals on par with those of humans.
9
Whewell says we should judge any being's pleasure based on the likeness
of that being to ourselves.'0 Mill then turns the tables and says you'd have
to defend slavery under that principle, because white people were always
saying that our pleasures were much more important than the pains we
inflicted on black people." In Britain, slavery was already very unpopular,
so Mill certainly could make that argument and expect his audience to
agree: It would be ridiculous to uphold the slaveholder over the abolition-
ist. Then he draws this conclusion, saying:
We are perfectly willing to stake the whole question on this one issue.
Granted, that any practice causes more pain to animals then it gives
pleasure to man, is this practice moral or immoral? And if exactly in
proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of self-
ishness, they do not with one voice answer immoral, let the morality
of the principle of utility be forever condemned.12
Now, that's a very vague principle and it's certainly not very ade-
quate. It's just what Mill seems to think he can say at this point to refute
the arguments of Whewell. Mill often adjusts his arguments to his audi-
ence, withholding more radical aspects of his views that he utters in other
contexts. The main point I want to get out of this is that Mill thought that
the pains of animals count in the Utilitarian calculus just as the pleasures
5. John Stuart Mill, Whewell on Moral Philosophy, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS
228-270 (Alan Ryan ed., Penguin Books 1987) (1852).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 251-52.
8. See id. at 251.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 252.
11. See id. at 252-53.
12. Id. at 253.
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of humans do. The Utilitarian calculus has to take into account the pains
and pleasures of all sentient beings. In other words, animals have interests.
Mill puts this in terms of pleasure and pain, but unlike Bentham, Mill ac-
tually recognized that pleasure and pain were very broad. His idea of hap-
piness was not just limited to bodily pleasure and physical pain. He
thought that the Utilitarian principle should promote a range of valuable
life activities for the creature in question.
I think this is very much like my capabilities approach. Mill was not
able to hold an academic position, so he wrote journalistically. It's always
a little difficult to figure out exactly what the implications of his texts are,
but I have tried to argue in things I have written that Mill is really like a
capabilities theorist. So he would have supported "happy lives" for ani-
mals-meaning flourishing lives with their own characteristic activities-
something much like my capabilities approach.13
So now to freedom of speech. Mill's On Liberty is an extended de-
fense of the tremendous importance of the freedom of speech for a decent
society.14 There are two lines of argument that people usually use today to
explain why freedom of speech is really so important.1 5 I am going to try
to show that Mill really meant those two lines of argument to apply to
animals. He didn't say it here because he always knew his audience and
sometimes, as I've said, left out the more radical things.
There are two lines of argument in On Liberty: the social utility ar-
gument and the personal happiness argument.16 As we will see, they are
very closely linked.
First, the social utility argument. Mill says that if we're making laws
and policies, we need to be able to figure out what really maximizes hap-
piness. That means that we need to be able to consider all of the available
views and information about welfare.'8 Then, continuing this thought, he
says: First of all, we should not assume that we have already found the
best way of life.19 That would be ridiculous.2 0 (Mill was a believer in pro-
gress over time.) And so, we need alternative inputs, including even radi-
cal inputs, which some people might be inclined to suppress.2 1 And se-
cond, even if we were sure that we had the best way, any good principle is
13. Martha Nussbaum, MillBetween Bentham andAristotle, 133 DAEDALUS 60, 65-68 (2004),
reprinted in ECONOMICS AND HAPPINESS: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS 178-82 (Luigino Bruni & Pier
Luigi Porta eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
14. See generally MILL, supra note 1.
15. See id.
16. See generally id




21. See id. at 88.
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likely to grow lazy and slack if it is not continually challenged by alterna-
tive viewpoints.2 2 In short, he explicitly defended unpopular and unpleas-
ant speech for the way in which, even if we can refute it in the end, it helps
23
us stay on guard and honest with respect to our own views.
Now to personal happiness. Mill draws heavily on German Romantic
views of self-development in On Liberty.2 4 Basically, his view is that all
people should have the opportunity to find what suits them-what makes
them happy-in life through what he calls "experiments in living."
25 The
Utilitarians clearly meant to apply this idea to radical forms of sexual life.
Mill was famous for having had a very intimate relationship with a married
woman for many years. It probably wasn't a sexual relationship because
Mill was kind of a cautious guy. Anyway, it was a love relationship. Then,
when the husband died, they actually got married. That was one radical
experiment. Mill was clearly defending gay rights as well. So experiments
in living are very important to help society find its way. In the end, his
argument for this idea is linked to social utility because his view is that the
human species learns things over time-we make progress-and human
happiness can increase through the testing of alternatives. But that can
never happen if people don't get to lead these lives. Certainly, people
won't get to lead these lives unless the speech that recommends these lives
is permitted. In both cases, we do best by protecting speech very broadly.
Mill's principle is basically like the one that currently dominates in U.S.
law, that is, unless there's an imminent threat of violence, there's no call
at all for the suppression of any kind of speech.
Needless to say, in On Liberty, which is addressed to people like
those who later became his fellow Parliamentarians, Mill doesn't talk
about animals. But Mill clearly was going to do that at some point in his
own thinking. Animals are on par with humans because we know that the
community whose happiness good laws promote includes all sentient be-
ings. We can now say on his behalf what he couldn't say in a discourse
that was meant to persuade in the England of his day.
How would we apply the insights of On Liberty to thinking about
animal rights and animal speech? First, I think the obvious thing is to rec-
ognize that animals have standing. Mill's arguments clearly imply that all
harms are cognizable under the law. Under the law, in a Millian state, an-
imals have standing because their harms are harms, just as human harms
are harms. Of course, animals have to be represented by a lawyer or a
guardian to go to court, but they can do that, just as human beings with
cognitive disabilities can now go to court.
But then what about humans' speech about animals? Well, once
again, there's going to be a very radical principle here, which is that there
22. See id.
23. See id. at 87-88.
24. See id. at 122.
25. Id. at 122.
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should be no suppression of any kind of human speech purporting to give
information about the well-being of animals. All of the discussion of "ag-
gag" laws are very pertinent here. Any law limiting that kind of infor-
mation would be a bad law.
But then what about speech by animals? Animals provide infor-
mation about their welfare in many ways. Some really do have some form
of quasi-linguistic communication. For instance, whales have song and el-
ephants have patterns of trumpeting. But that isn't really the whole issue
because in many ways-through their behavior and evidence of their de-
light, fear, and pain-animals are giving us information all the time even
without anything like speech if we would stop, look, and interact with
them. So here I'm very much in agreement with Will Kymlicka and Sue
Donaldson. In their book, Zoopolis, they say very plausibly that the many
ways in which domesticated animals give evidence of their preferences,
satisfactions, dissatisfactions, fears, and longings should be taken into ac-
count through an established system of surrogacy when making law and
policy.26 This surrogacy occurs when humans would then represent those
interests under the law. But where I disagree with Kymlicka and Don-
aldson is that I really don't see any reason to draw any sharp line between
domesticated animals and wild animals. They somehow suggest that wild
animals are living in a condition that's not managed by human beings, but
that's just not the world that we live in. Wild animals can't just go off and
decide to lead the lives they want on their own, because human beings are
interfering with those lives all the time, usually for the worse.
Of course, we need to learn a lot to do this well. We're learning more
all the time and we need to do what Kymlicka and Donaldson so rightly
recommend: we must have a kind of sensitive interaction with these ani-
mals where we listen to them, look at them, absorb what they're saying to
us, and then try to figure this out. This is more complicated by the fact,
which I think Kymlicka and Donaldson don't take into account enough,
that animals can have what economists call "adaptive preferences." That
is, if they're living a very deprived life, let's say they're getting cut off
from the very social group that's characteristic for them, they may not reg-
ister that by showing pain. Yet, we can figure out by studying the species
more generally that there is an inadequate form of life for them. Anyway,
combining what we know about an animal's form of life with the infor-
mation that animals are giving us all the time, we can conclude a lot of
different things and then act on these conclusions.
Utilitarians were of course people of their time and place, and it was
a really bad era in Britain, where, for the most part, animals just didn't
count at all. European traditions at the time were much worse than other
26. SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL THEORY OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
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world traditions, as Bentham notes in the passage I quoted. The Utilitari-
ans were radicals and they challenged the idea that animals didn't count at
all. But Mill was also a pragmatist, so he did not always state the full im-
plications of his thought. But if we put the pieces together, the implications
are absolutely clear: On Liberty does apply to human speech on behalf of
animals and also to the speech of animals about their own welfare. Now is
the time where, unlike Mill, we can seize the radical implications of his
insights for the law. Thank you. Now I will take questions.
QUESTION AND ANSWER
Question: You talked about how speech on behalf of animals
should be protected Could you talk about United States v.
StevenS27 and a person's free speech rights to depict cruelty
to animals?
Of course, there are going to be tragic dilemmas. That's a whole issue
on which I think the Utilitarians were not very good. But what's really bad
about the whole way that case was treated was that the speech of animals
conveying their pain and torment was not really taken into account at all.
So what we really should do is say that there two kinds of speech. If we
see that a kind of human speech is heavily implicated in the promoting in
a kind of cruelty, which the animal speech records in no uncertain terms,
then there would be a very strong case for the limiting of that kind of hu-
man speech. I think all of those cases are hard cases and we must
acknowledge that they are hard cases, but that conclusion, here, seems ob-
vious to me. It's not as hard as some other cases because the imminent
danger of violence is there. It's just that the Brandenburg v. Ohio28 princi-
ple has been understood in too narrow a way. It's been understood as vio-
lence by humans against other humans, but violence by humans against
animals is now part of the picture too. Well, that kind of snuff film por-
nography does constitute an imminent threat of violence, and I think it was
just badly framed and badly understood. I think we need to completely
reformulate that by taking the speech of animals about violence and their
pain into account.
Question: My question is on your point about adaptive prefer-
ences regarding wild animals, but I wanted to ask it more
broadly in terms of the violence that really underscores hu-
manity's relationship to nonhuman animals historically.
Even if we think about what we call domesticated animals,
you can see it as a long history of adaptive preferences that
have been shaped by selective breeding by human, etcetera.
27. United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (holding that a statute criminalizing the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty was "substantially overbroad,"
and therefore invalid under First Amendment free speech protections).
28. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that First Amendment
protections do not extend to speech aimed at inciting or producing "imminent lawless actions").
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So what does it even mean to think about free speech for an-
imals in a context in which the very subjectivity of the other
has been so deeply shaped by a violent context?
Thank you. I am actually in pretty full agreement with Kymlicka and
Donaldson there. In some recent articles, which you've probably seen-
there's one in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies29-they take up this
question: Should we really think back to the pre-domestication scenario
and thereby think that it's just unjustified to live symbiotically at all with
dogs, cats, and so on? Therefore, we should just let them be free? Now,
they argue, I think rather persuasively, that we have to start with where we
are and with the creatures of the world that we're living in.30 Sometimes
you can't fix the history, and the dogs and the cats are there. They are
living in a symbiotic relationship with humans, and there's no good reason
to think that they would be better off just being let go, free from human
guidance and interaction. Indeed, there's reason to think, and again I agree
with them, that domesticated animals often derive great satisfaction and
pleasure from the skills they deploy and the work that they do in an inter-
relationship with humans. Let's take the border collie or the sheep dog as
examples. There's this display of trained skill which is pleasing to the an-
imal. The animal gives speech about this as it were. It gives evidence of
its own pleasure in that interactive relationship.
How far this extends is very unclear. I think they focus on dogs and
cats for good reason, because those species have been so thoroughly
evolved in a domesticated situation that they wouldn't do very well if they
were just let to roam. Songbirds are much less clear. And horses are a little
bit less clear. Now, they think that the horse probably shouldn't be ridden,
but I actually don't see this. I've been involved with horseback riders a lot.
I think that although cruel practices are very dominant in that world and
unfortunately are still there, even though they are becoming less so, the
pleasure that a trained jumper gets from jumping and bonding with the
rider is something that we ought to consider. I'm with Kymlicka and Don-
aldson in thinking that the idea of just turning back the clock and thinking
that we could undo evolution is not a good idea.
It's really quite different for wild animals though. Although they are
living in a human-dominated context, they haven't evolved in any way that
responds to that domination. Again, the line is hard to draw here because
elephants have performed work with humans-Asian Elephants in partic-
ular, ever since World War II where they were a major part of the victory
over the Japanese in Asia. There they were trained very sensitively by only
positive reinforcement from a person in the British army who had innova-
tive ideas about this. So we have to look and see, and look at each species
29. See Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, Animals and the Frontiers ofCitizenship, 34 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 201 (2014) (discussing how animal citizenship would both promote justice for
animals and deepen fundamental democratic values).
30. Id. at 204-05.
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one by one. But for the most part, we should be taking the evidence of
each animal for its form of life-what makes it happy-and try and give
it those conditions by responsible stewardship of the environment, which
is becoming more and more difficult because of human overpopulation.
Responsible stewardship very much includes limiting human population.
Question: If we extended this not only to include the past but
also the future, what utility would the Utilitarian way of
thinking have to say, for example, the agribusiness corporate
companies who might want to engineer a pig incapable of
feeling pain?
That example always gets pulled out to suggest hat we can fix things
so that there's no problem. Well, of course, my Utilitarianism is not just
talking about pain; it's talking about a whole form of life. That's why I
prefer Mill to Bentham. I think Bentham was just too narrow, although he
had reasons for that in his own context. I think we have to think: Here's a
creature who has a complicated form of life, is it getting to lead that form
of life? We should be striving for simulated forms of animal protein that
may satisfy meat eaters because they taste like meat, but they don't involve
the exploitation of animals-of any kind of living sentient being-at all.
I've long said this about animal experimentation: we can do so many
things now by computer simulation that there's a future where we don't
have to use animals at all to see the implications of a new surgical tech-
nique or a new form of drug treatment. That seems to me a future that we
should strive for.
Question: Ijust want to pause over the question ofwhat freedom
of speech animals currently have, and your focus, which is
more on why they should have it. You've given us the reasons
that we all know animals express themselves and that there's
adaptation, in which case their expression may be con-
strained and not natural. I guess the question is, are we talk-
ing about a special case where it becomes our duty to create
the best conditions in which expression can be most honest,
which is quite differentfrom freedom of speech for humans,
in which case we don't typically impose that duty upon our-
selves? If that's the case, where does it go? Does it go to-
wards imposing some duty upon us to listen and pay atten-
tion? Does it go down a copyright path? What are all of the
diferent dimensions that a more robust freedom of speech
might take us?
First, there's the issue of standing. Now, even though there may be
distorted preferences, at least humans get to express their preferences. The
animals can do it only when some human cares enough to try to make the
law come out that way. But if the law is not enforced, let's say laws against
cruelty, then there is no animal that has standing to go to court. Humans
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acting as animal advocates don't usually have standing either. Fixing that
goes a long way.
But the adaptation problem actually came up in my work in connec-
tion with humans. I've spent about twenty years of my career working with
women in developing countries. You poll them and ask if they want to
have more education, and they'll often say no. They've been brought up
to be afraid of more education. They've been told that more education
makes them unmarriageable or is bad for them and so on. Even if you tell
them about all the things that education opens up for women, then they
don't respond to that particularly well because they're living in these con-
ditions all the time. Now, one of the things that we've talked about a lot in
the development context is creating conditions under which women would
then, first of all, be free to express preferences without fear. But then, too,
their preferences gradually shift and, as they grow to understand their pos-
sibilities, their dignity, and their agency, they form more adequate prefer-
ences. Women's groups in India largely have that function. Women,
whether they've left their husbands or whether they haven't, band together
in solidarity and talk with other women about their life conditions. They
then learn very quickly that there are actually possibilities that they have
in a group of other women that they didn't actually think that they had at
all. My book, Women and Human Development, is all about transcending
the adaptive in that way.31
Now, we have that in the "Me Too" movement as well.32 We now see
that women were living in conditions of fear for years and years. They
didn't come forward with reports of sexual harassment and sexual vio-
lence. Sometimes they didn't even recognize what happened to them as
abuse. We see this with the girls who were the victims of Dr. Nassar.33
Their parent didn't even recognize that what was happening to them was
abuse because of the adaptation of preferences that says whatever a doctor
tells you is okay. This whole movement is about undoing adaptation and
creating conditions of freedom in which women can come forward and be
believed. It's still very incomplete, but at least it's happening. I think we
have to figure out what else we can do to make it happen more. We
shouldn't have to wait twenty years to have a woman come forward and
say that she has been sexually violated.
I think it's not a different problem at all. For example, you take ani-
mals in zoos who may not be yelling in pain, and yet they're deprived of
31. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 111-66 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (discussing adaptive preferences and women's op-
tions).
32. See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-
burke.html, for a discussion of the history and origins of the "Me Too" movement.
33. See Christine Hauser, Larry Nassar Is Sentenced to Another 40 to 125 Years in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/sports/larry-nassar-sentencing-hear-
ing.html, for an overview of the Larry Nassar investigation, trial, and sentencing.
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the company of other creatures of their kind. We can study such animals
when they do exist in what I'll call "greater freedom." I won't say "free-
dom absolute" because there is no such thing in this world, but let's say
elephants that live in a big wildlife preserve instead of a zoo. They give us
evidence that we can then use to say that this is not so good for animals to
live in a zoo and not have any other animals of their type around. We
would then gradually try to undo the confinement of elephants in zoos and
forbid the trafficking of elephants into new zoos, just as Friends of Ani-
mals has been working on very heroically for some time.
34 Then we would
create for elephants the conditions in which they could express and gravi-
tate toward the form of life that they would actually choose. That would
be the basic idea.
Question: When talking about animal speech, as with humans
with significant cognitive limitations and/or children, we're
always talking about a certain degree ofpaternalism. Do you
have any cautions for us in thinking about the problems in-
herent in representational speech?
Yes, there are big problems. Eva Kittay, who I think is the philoso-
pher who has done the best work on humans with disabilities within the
field of philosophy,35 spent years heroically pursuing these things in the
name of, and using the example of, her own daughter Sesha, who has mul-
tiple and very severe cognitive disabilities. However, she later recognized
that she had been guilty of paternalism because she thought Sesha was
indicating that she wanted to be with the parents all the time, to be shel-
tered and taken care of. Well, a mother can easily feel that way, especially
with a child who is so vulnerable. But then, at one point, Sesha ended up
briefly living in a group home and Eva recognized that she had been flour-
ishing there in a way that she had not flourished in their own home. That
made her backtrack and recognize that we really have great dangers when
we read the preferences of even our own children.
I think there are all the same issues with animals, but maybe a little
less so because parents have all kinds of reasons for misreading. They are
so personally invested in their children and they see the child as another
"them." They impose on the child all kinds of hopes and fears for them-
selves. Maybe, just maybe, we're a little bit more honest with respect to
other animals because we don't project ourselves onto them in the same
way. Anyway, that doesn't mean that we aren't prone to error, but it might
be a different kind of error. With anything like that, we just need to realize
what the possibilities for error are and then try to work around it. But in
the case of studying animals, we're lucky enough to be able to observe
34. See Marielle Grenade-Willis, Keeping Elephants in Zoos Is Not a Right to Ethical Consid-
eration, FRIENDS OF ANIMALS (Oct. 4,2017), https://friendsofanimals.org/keeping-elephants-in-zoos-
is-not-a-right-to-ethical-consideration.
35. See generally EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND
DEPENDENCY (Routledge 1999).
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how they live when we minimally interfere, in the case of many wild ani-
mals. That gives us a lot of help.

WHAT AN EXTENSION OF FREE SPEECH RIGHTS TO
ANIMALS MIGHT MEAN, DOCTRINALLY SPEAKING
VIKRAM DAVID AMARt
Professor Martha Nussbaum's Keynote Address and Essay, Why
Freedom of Speech Is an Important Right and Why Animals Should Have
It,' is characteristically ambitious, creative, thought-provoking, and im-
portant. And in my short comment on it I could never fully list, much less
explore, all the interesting ideas it contains. On top of that, I am a consti-
tutional law scholar, not a philosopher, so I am not fully competent to en-
gage some of Professor Nussbaum's interpretations of the relevant theo-
ries and texts (to say nothing of the biographical materials) in which she
is steeped and on which she draws. Accordingly, what I do in the space
below is simply pose a question and begin to explain-in constitutional
doctrinal terms (my own bailiwick)-why the answer might matter.
Taking as a given the seemingly incontrovertible notion (documented
by Professor Nussbaum) that John Stuart Mill cared deeply about the well-
being of animals and wanted members of society to discuss and factor in
that well-being in their individual and collective decisions,2 my question
is this: Do Mill's ideas logically compel the notion that animals should
have legal rights of their own (vindicable through human legal represent-
atives), or instead do Mill's views simply make clear that animals have
much to tell us, and that if we listen to them we will take away important
lessons about their welfare?3 If the latter, narrower, reading is plausible,
we certainly can and should try hard to hear what nonhuman creatures
have to say as we take actions and craft laws with respect to overall wel-
fare. But that is a different animal, so to speak, from the idea that nonhu-
man creatures themselves have, or should have, free speech rights in the
ordinary sense in which we constitutionalists invoke the term. It seems to
me that many of the passages in Mill's writings that Professor Nussbaum
explicates, and the Millian ideas on which she builds, could be quite con-
sistent with both the narrower and the broader set of consequences, and
that from a philosophical standpoint the two endpoints might not be that
different. But constitutionally speaking, which of these paths we pursue
t Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Cham-
paign Illinois. The author wishes to thank the staff of Denver Law Review for inviting him to attend
and participate in their symposium event held in Denver on Friday, February 9, 2018.
1. Martha Nussbaum, Why Freedom ofSpeech Is an Important Right and Why Animals Should
Have It, 95 DENv. L. REV. 843 (2018).
2. Id. at 843, 847-48.
3. I am indebted to fellow symposium participant and first-rate free speech scholar Heidi
Kitrosser for this framing.
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could have significant First Amendment implications. Professor Nuss-
baum, understandably, does not wade very deeply into doctrinal waters in
her offering, but I shall try to do that just a bit.
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF STANDING
Let us begin with the legal doctrine of "standing," something that
Professor Nussbaum mentions briefly and as to which the consequences
of applying Mill narrowly or broadly are non-negligible but perhaps not
momentous.4 Professor Nussbaum argues (from Millian premises): "I
think the obvious thing is . .. that animals have standing. Mill's arguments
clearly imply that all harms are cognizable under the law. . . . Of course,
animals have to be represented by a lawyer or a guardian to go to court,
but they can do that, just as human beings with cognitive disabilities can
now go to court."5
Under current doctrine, while people (including organizations of peo-
ple) can, if they satisfy certain requirements, enjoy legal standing,
6 animals
and trees cannot.7 But, importantly, people can obtain standing based on
their attitudes towards or their relationships with animals, trees, and other
parts of nature. So people often are able to establish standing, says the
Supreme Court, based on their desire to observe, study, worship, or make
material use of animals.8 Or based on their desire to simply experience and
enjoy animals or nature in particular settings.
9 The inability of humans to
interact with animals-both domestic and wild-creates a cognizable in-
jury that comfortably suffices as a basis for standing under current doc-
trine. In fact, in a large percentage of the rulings where the Supreme Court
has rejected standing in disputes involving the natural environment, the
plaintiffs, for strategic long-term reasons or out of carelessness, have
simply neglected to specify or document in any meaningful way the rela-
tionship between humankind and animals or nature that is being impaired
or threatened by a defendant's conduct.io
Certainly Mill's insights and attitudes are relevant to current doctrine
even if we do not go so far as to confer independent standing on animals.
Taking Mill seriously-even if we read him narrowly-would, at the very
least, allow people to argue that they have standing to challenge practices
that reduce the amount of speech animals produce because the people want
to hear animals' voices. "I want to listen" to animals is just as important
&
4. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.
5. Id.
6. At least in federal court-I am using federal justiciability as the paradigm example of stand-
ing limitations, recognizing that state rules vary by state.
7. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 450, 456 (1972).
8. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
9. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 678 (1973).
10. E.g., Defs. of Wildlfe, 504 U.S. at 564; Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
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an interest-the impairment of which constitutes a cognizable injury-as
"I want to hunt" animals, or "I want to study" animals, or "I want to wor-
ship" animals. At a minimum, then, current standing doctrine could incor-
porate Mill's insights to broaden the kind of relationships individuals can
plausibly assert to have human standing to challenge certain kinds of con-
duct that restrains animals. That expansion of current doctrine could be
meaningful but would also be incremental rather than revolutionary.
What if, by contrast, we read and apply Mill more broadly and ambi-
tiously to embrace the notion that animals themselves have free speech
rights and standing (via human representatives) to assert those rights, such
that no human in court need allege any particular relationship to the ani-
mals in question? If we went that route, then anybody could sue (perhaps
seeking attorneys' fees in certain cases) claiming to be a guardian for ani-
mals. No person would need to allege, let alone document, any interest
relating to the animal speech that was allegedly constrained; he or she
would simply have to establish adequacy of representation. Perhaps, prac-
tically speaking, that would not be such a big change in the current state
of affairs either, since (as mentioned above) it is generally not hard to find
a person to serve as a plaintiff who could allege a desire to hear the animals
in question. And most would-be representatives, whether individual or or-
ganizational, could probably satisfy the relationship requirement doctrine
currently imposes if they pleaded the requisite facts specifically enough. I
suppose one significant change in current law resulting from a formal con-
ferral of rights on the animals themselves might be the need for courts in
some cases to anticipate the effects a party's conduct might have on ani-
mals' ability to express themselves, and to appoint a representative in
cases where those animals' interests are at stake but where the court is not
sure that existing parties adequately have the animals' interests at heart.
Treating animals like minors in this regard would probably involve an ex-
pansion of the role of judges and lawyers in these matters.
POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MERITS OF FREE SPEECH / FIRST
AMENDMENT CLAIMS
But the really big doctrinal differences between a narrower or broader
application of Mill's ideas seem to emerge when we move from standing
to the merits of free speech cases. To see how, let us work our way through
the so-called "ag-gag" law context that Professor Nussbaum invokes."
About this, Professor Nussbaum says: "[T]here's going to be a very radical
principle here, which is that there should be no suppression of any kind of
human speech purporting to give information about the well-being of ani-
mals.... Any law limiting that kind of information would be a bad law."l2
Certainly I do not take Professor Nussbaum here to mean that just
because a person is speaking about animal welfare, she is immune from
I1. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.
12. Id.
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all regulation. A true threat against someone falls outside of First Amend-
ment protection and thus can be punished even if the threat is premised on
an articulated and sincere desire to protect animals.13 And I doubt that Pro-
fessor Nussbaum quarrels with that. To the extent that Professor Nuss-
baum is advocating here for a zero-tolerance policy concerning laws that
try to silence speakers based on an aversion 'to their animal-protective
message, the doctrine already reflects what Professor Nussbaum wants.
Using Professor Nussbaum's own words, current doctrine can accurately
be described to say: "[a]ny law limiting [speech based on any particular]
kind of information [whether about animal welfare or any other topic is] a
bad law" insofar as it is content- or viewpoint-based and thus already sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.14
This should cause us to wonder: On the question of ag-gag laws,
would choosing between the two different Millian applications matter? In
many instances, the answer would be no. As mentioned above, it is already
clear that the government cannot punish the expression of materials con-
cerning animal cruelty because lawmakers disfavor that content. Similarly,
the government cannot single out information-collection tactics relating to
animal cruelty and punish them specially because the government does not
want that particular kind of information to be known or disseminated.
Laws of both of those types violate the near-absolute constitutional ban on
content- or viewpoint-based regulation of expression. And this is true
whether animals have rights or not. As long as people care about and want
to learn and talk about animal cruelty (which they would even under the
narrower, nonrights, application of Mill), then laws designed to target and
punish information collection and dissemination about this particular topic
are, to use Professor Nussbaum's word, "bad." And that would be so if we
substituted human cruelty for animal cruelty as the disfavored topic. What
drives the doctrine here is not so much why the individuals are wanting to
collect information and speak, but why the government is regulating. An-
imals do not need to have rights for us to frown on regulation that is moti-
vated by a desire to suppress certain messages or messengers.
The more difficult question posed by some of the more carefully
crafted ag-gag regulations is what we can infer, based on the government's
site-specific regulation of animal slaughter places, about censorial motive.
13. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381, 383 (1992).
14. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 849.
15. In this regard, consider Professor Nussbaum's important point that symbolic conduct such
as flag burning-and not just oral human speech-counts under the First Amendment. See id at 843.
But most cases in which regulation of symbolic conduct has been struck down involve situations in
which government is regulating the conduct because of its symbolic expressive character. What mat-
ters is why the government is regulating; a ban on flag burning is much harder to uphold than a ban
on cloth burning that might include the burning of many flags. When government regulates symbolic
conduct for reasons having nothing to do with expression, then the courts apply a more lenient stand-
ard. (More on that below.) See id
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Do these laws, by targeting certain modes of information collection at cer-
tain locales, evince a legislative motive to target particular subjects or
points of view such that they should be viewed as content- or viewpoint-
based at all?
Sometimes the government regulates a site and expressive activity
that takes place on or near it not because the speech is likely to involve a
particular subject matter or viewpoint but because that kind of site is where
there have been certain kinds of problems (e.g., interference with mobility,
violence, trespass, etc.) that the government has a legitimate interest in
regulating.1 So if the problem of improper trespass or fraudulent entry or
invasion of privacy is particularly pronounced in certain places like
slaughterhouses, and those are problems that can be regulated without fear
that the government is censoring, then many would argue we should not
apply strict scrutiny to some laws that single out those venues. But if the
context and phrasing of a particular law suggest that the site and kinds of
regulation were chosen with an eye toward certain messages, then we
should be very skeptical indeed of the law.
Yet even if we do not suspect that "official suppression of ideas is
afoot," 7 we generally apply a meaningful level of review (though not strict
scrutiny) to laws that have the effect of burdening human expression in a
meaningful way.'8 And it is in these kinds of settings where the choice
between applying the two Millian interpretations matters a lot.
The Court uses a pair of doctrinal formulations to assess situations in
which the government is not regulating in a content- or viewpoint-based
way, but is regulating in such a way as to potentially dampen or reduce the
amount of human speech that is allowed.19 Again, the test under both these
formulations is not strict scrutiny, but it is also not a rubber stamp.20 And
under either of these formulations, a doctrinal recognition that animals
have free speech rights of their own could have very significant conse-
quences.
Under one formulation, as it was articulated by the Court in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,21 when the government regulates what is conven-
tionally thought of as expressive activity but does so by means of a con-
tent-neutral law, the Court insists that the content-neutral regulation of the
time, place or manner of speech be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."2 2 A second formulation is typically
16. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530-33 (2014).
17. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390.
18. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
21. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
22. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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invoked when the regulation involves activity that may not generally be
thought of as expressive but which some individuals might engage in for
expressive purposes (e.g., sleeping in public, burning items, etc.).
23 in
cases involving the use of conventionally nonexpressive conduct to
communicate a message, like the famous O'Brien v. United States24 draft-
card-burning case, the Court puts the test as follows: "[The law must]
further[] an important or substantial governmental interest . .. unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and . . . the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedom [must be] no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."25
The two formulations are similar, but not identical. The empirical
data, which accords with many scholars' common-sense intuitions, would26
suggest hat under the O'Brien formulation, fewer laws are struck down.
But under both tests-and this is the key-if animals were granted free
speech rights themselves, many more laws would be in jeopardy of inval-
idation. In the ag-gag context, for example, if we found no censorship but
viewed the law as a content-neutral regulation of a place (slaughterhouses)
and manner (use of some less-than-candid means) of information collec-
tion and speech, we would apply the Ward test today and ask whether the
ban on certain sharp practices would prevent people from getting their
message out. The answer might be "no" to the extent that there are other
(albeit perhaps somewhat more expensive) ways for people to collect and
disseminate the information in question. But if we asked whether a ban on
information collection practices would prevent people or the specific ani-
mals at the facility from getting their particular message out, the answer
might be different. People might be able to get the information concerning
animal conditions from other sources and disseminate it; the particular an-
imals in question could not themselves get their message out if people are
prevented from hearing them.
So too if we apply the O'Brien test; if the speech on which a regula-
tion has an effect includes animals' ability to convey information about
themselves, then whether the regulation restricts animals' speech "no more
than is essential" to the government's interest often becomes a much
harder question to answer.
Indeed, if we say animals actually have speech rights, then arguably
we have an obligation to accommodate or facilitate animal speech in set-
tings well beyond ag-gag laws. For example, all kinds of laws and regula-
tions that, on their face, do not focus on expressive activities will nonethe-
less incidentally make it harder for animals, but not necessarily people, to
speak. Take regulations that authorize the government to construct a road
23. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 39 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
24. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
25. Id. at 377.
26. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 782, 792 (2007).
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as just one example. The construction of many roads will destroy the hab-
itat for many individual animals, making it hard for them to live, let alone
express themselves. Right now, we would not judge such a project under
any First Amendment standard, since the project would not have foresee-
able speech-constraining implications for persons. But under O'Brien,
would the First Amendment require government o minimize environmen-
tal-habitat impacts because the incidental suppression of some animals'
speech is larger than it had to be? Would we, in effect, be broadening and
constitutionalizing environmental law protections in the name of the First
Amendment? I do not have answers to these questions, but they are the
kinds of interesting ones that we might need to confront if we embrace the
broader application of Mill's ideas and try to enshrine it into constitutional
law and the discourse of rights.

EDGY ANIMAL WELFARE
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ABSTRACT
Legal animal welfare proponents should not reject out-of-hand re-
forms that may be celebrated by some as steps toward a radical version of
animal rights.' Rather, animal welfare proponents should consider the
costs, risks, and benefits of all potential reforms. Some potential reforms'
risks and costs outweigh their benefits. But, both to improve animals' wel-
fare and to avoid irrelevance in an evolving society, legal animal welfare
advocates should be willing to tolerate some costs and risks. Walking on
the edge of slippery slopes is in some situations better than avoiding the
slopes altogether. Connecticut's 2016 animal advocacy statute provides an
illustration of legal reform that legal animal welfare proponents should
embrace even though it presents some risks of being perceived as a step
toward a radical legal personhood rights paradigm.
I. THE SLIPPERY RHETORIC OF "ANIMAL RIGHTS"
This Essay addresses navigating slippery rhetoric and slippery slopes.
A September 2017 article in the New York Times illustrates the kind of
slippery rhetoric at issue.2 The article's headline stated: Guggenheim,
Bowing to Animal Rights Activists, Pulls Works from Show.3 The article
described a controversial work in a show at New York's Solomon R. Gug-
genheim Art Museum as "a video of 'Dogs That Cannot Touch Each
Other,' in which four pairs of dogs try to fight one another but struggle to
touch because they are on nonmotorized treadmills.'A The article reported
that the museum withdrew the show "after it had come under unrelenting
pressure from animal rights supporters and critics over works in the exhi-
bition."5
t John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank Don Buf-
faloe for his outstanding work in assisting me with this Essay as a research librarian.
I. For the sake of brevity, this Essay will refer to nonhuman animals as "animals."
2. See Matthew Haag, Guggenheim, Bowing to Animal-Rights Activists, Pulls Works from
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ypdA5P.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The reference to "critics" as well as "animal-rights supporters" in the article's text may
reflect recognition that not only animal rights supporters applied pressure to the Guggenheim to pull
the exhibits. However, this nuance is not reflected in the article's headline.
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The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was one of
the organizations that challenged the Guggenheim exhibition.
6 PETA ad-
vocates for animal rights.7 But the only other group specifically identified
in the article as challenging the exhibition was the American Kennel Club
(AKC). 8 The AKC was quoted as protesting that dogfighting "should not
be displayed in any manner and certainly not as art." 9
Despite the New York Times headline, the AKC does not view itself
as an "animal rights" organization.'0 The organization describes itself as
"the largest purebred dog registry in the world."" Many people who de-
scribe themselves as animal rights activists oppose breeding dogs.'
2 In re-
jecting animal rights language, the AKC instead says it supports "animal
welfare." 3 Although it rejects animal rights, the AKC takes positions
against what it views as animal cruelty, as demonstrated in the Guggen-
heim art exhibit protests.14
Was the New York Times's headline wrong? The renowned torts
scholar William Prosser wrote that the nebulous concept of proximate
cause is "all things to all men."'5 Few legal constructs are more slippery
than proximate cause, and Dean Prosser's quote provides an analogy. Per-
haps "animal rights" in law means all things to all people.
As with proximate cause, the existence of countless shades of nuance
does not prevent us from identifying in broad outline some prominent
views regarding the nature of legal animal rights. Two significant inter-
pretations of legal animal rights, one of which has a quite loose subset,
may be recognized. The first, which provides a low bar, asserts that be-
cause laws exist to protect animals, animals have legal rights.'
6 If this were
the consensus definition of legal animal rights, the term's problematic as-
pects would be greatly lessened, although they would still be considerable.
The loose subset of this interpretation is "followed" by individuals who
have not given much thought to the nature of the term animal rights, but
6. Id.
7. PETA's mission statement describes itself as "the largest animal rights organization in the
world." About PETA, PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
8. See Haag, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. See About, AM. KENNEL CLUB, http://www.akc.org/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Animal Rights Uncompromised: There's No Such Thing as a 'Responsible
Breeder,' PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/why-peta/responsible-breeders (last visited Mar.
18, 2018) ("[A]s long as dogs and cats are dying in animal shelters and pounds because of a lack of
homes, no breeding can be considered 'responsible."').
13. See Understanding the Diference Between Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, AM.
KENNEL CLUB (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.akc.org/content/news/articles/difference-between-animal-
rights-animal-welfare.
14. Id.; Haag, supra note 2.
15. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 284 (3d ed. 1964).
16. The author has addressed the various meanings that might be ascribed to "animal rights" in
more depth in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Animals as More than "Mere Things," but Still Property: A Call
for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1041-45.
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who view it simply as being good to animals. To many in the public, sup-
porting animal rights in law may mean simply the same thing as supporting
laws that promote humane treatment of animals with little or no thought
given to the implications of labelling these legal protections as rights.
A much more demanding definition of legal animal rights is that they
would only truly exist were animals to have some form of legal person-
hood and to have the power, through some form of legal guardian, to assert
their interests in courts.17 In addition to being more demanding, this inter-
pretation is more explosive in its societal implications. If this version of
rights were granted to all animals capable of suffering pain, society would
likely undergo dramatic upheaval. Most current uses of mammals and
other vertebrates (e.g., food, clothing, and the use of such animals in test-
ing to achieve medical breakthroughs) would arguably have to end. Efforts
to attain legal personhood for particularly intelligent animals such as chim-
panzees are aimed at developing such rights for at least some animals to
break through the legal "wall" between humans and animals.'8
An animal welfare paradigm, which seeks appropriate care for ani-
mals but which rejects the notion of legal rights for animals, is presently
the dominant approach to animal protection laws in the United States.19
Animal welfare focuses on humans' responsibility to balance human in-
terests and the appropriate treatment of animals.20 However, although an-
imal welfare advocates reject rights concepts, in many or most instances
the practical interests of both major groups of animal rights advocates and
animal welfare may overlap.2 1 Most plausible legal reform efforts at pre-
sent are directed toward preventing animal cruelty rather than directly
challenging animals' legal status, and sincere supporters of animal welfare
as well as animal rights supporters wish to prevent animal cruelty.22
Legal reform regarding animals is proceeding at a rapid pace,23 and
supporters of an animal rights paradigm are often its most vocal propo-
nents. Not surprisingly, many animal rights advocates may celebrate ad-
vances in animal protection laws as steps that they hope will facilitate
eventually winning recognition of legal rights and personhood for animals.
As demonstrated in the New York Times' Guggenheim article headline,
media organizations often conflate animal welfare and animal rights.2 4
17. Mary Anne Warren has provided a thoughtful discussion of the "strong" animal rights po-
sition versus a softer position still described as supporting animal rights. See generally Mary Anne
Warren, Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position, 2 BETWEEN SPECIES 163, 163-64 (1986).
18. See Richard L. Cupp, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Per-
sonhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465, 513-17 (2017) (asserting that courts should focus on an evolving ani-
mal welfare paradigm rather than accepting animal legal personhood).
19. Id. at 516-17.
20. Cupp, supra note 16, at 1038.
21. Id. at 1030-34.
22. Id.
23. Cupp, supra note 18, at 470-72 (addressing the rapid evolution of public opinion and legal
reform to provide more protection to animals).
24. See Haag, supra note 2.
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This conflation may benefit proponents of more extreme interpretations of
animal rights because it may promote an impression that advocating for
animal protection is equivalent to advocating for a rights paradigm.
Animal welfare proponents should be concerned about the potential
for a gradual slide into an animal rights paradigm, eased along by the com-
monplace error of conflating animal protection and animal rights advo-
cacy. However, opposition to legal rights for animals should not equate to
opposition to any reform that might be argued to provide some sort of step
toward legal rights for animals. This is so even regarding reforms that may
be proclaimed to be steps toward the more extreme interpretations of legal
animal rights, such as support for animal legal personhood. Rather, animal
welfare proponents must balance the benefits of each potential reform to
animals' well-being against its risks on a case-by-case basis, and must ac-
tively support proposed reforms whose benefits in protecting animals out-
weigh their risks and costs. To do otherwise would not only shirk human
responsibility to appropriately protect animals. It would also imperil the
very existence of the animal welfare paradigm in a rapidly evolving soci-
ety.
II. CONNECTICUT'S 2016 STATUTE ALLOWING JUDGES TO APPOINT
ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE IN ANIMAL CRUELTY PROSECUTIONS: AN
ILLUSTRATION OF BENEFITS OUTWEIGHING RISKS
A. A Statute Representing the Interests ofJustice
In late 2016, Connecticut enacted a statute that provides an illustra-
tion of the kind of legal reform that animal welfare proponents should em-
brace, despite it having some slippery-slope potential as a step toward an-
imal legal personhood.25 The 2016 law, Section 54-86n of the Connecticut
General Statutes Annotated, is entitled "Appointment of advocate in pro-
ceeding re the welfare or custody of a cat or dog. Advocate's duties. De-
partment of Agriculture to maintain list of eligible advocates"
26 (the Act).
The Act gives judges the option of appointing a separate representative "to
represent he interests of justice" in animal cruelty prosecutions involving
cats and dogs.2 7 Under the Act, judges may appoint such representatives
on their own initiative or upon the motion of a party to the litigation or
counsel for any party.2 8 Judges have discretion regarding whether to ap-
point a representative.2 9
The Act provides that a list of potential representatives will be kept
by the state's Department of Agriculture.3 0 The list includes as follows:
25. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n (West 2016).
26. Id.






[A]ttorneys with knowledge of animal law issues and the legal system
and a list of law schools that have students, or anticipate having stu-
dents, with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such at-
tomeys and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis
as advocates under this section.
The Act's summary described its purpose as being "[t]o permit the
use of animal advocates in certain legal proceedings relating to neglected
or cruelly treated animals."32 Appointed advocates may do the following:
(1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual with information that
could aid the judge or fact finder and review records relating to the
condition of the cat or dog and the defendant's actions, including, but
not limited to, records from animal control officers, veterinarians, and
police officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4) present information or rec-
ommendations to the court pertinent to determinations that relate to the
interests of justice, provided such information and recommendations
shall be based solely upon the duties undertaken pursuant to this sub-
section.33
B. The Act's Slippery-Slope Risks
Virtually all legal reforms providing stronger protections for animals
have at least some potential to contribute to the slipperiness of a slope that
could cause society to slide downward into a harmful animal rights legal
paradigm. This is because any time law evolves to give more protections
to animals it brings legal requirements regarding them at least a bit closer
to legal requirements regarding humans. But, of course, the existence of
some risk of harm emphatically cannot be a basis for rejecting all pro-
animal reforms. Some risks are great, but many risks are manageable.
Some potential reform would dramatically improve animals' welfare, and
some potential reform would only marginally or debatably improve their
welfare. These variables must be balanced in determining whether a par-
ticular reform measure is desirable.
Some groups that might be associated with supporting an animal wel-
fare paradigm apparently concluded that the Connecticut Act's risks or
utility costs outweighed its benefits and thus opposed the animal advocate
bill at least at some point along its path toward becoming a law.34 The
AKC, which, as noted above, describes itself as an animal welfare propo-
nent35 and which was noted in the New York Times article described above
as one of the groups opposing the Guggenheim exhibits on animal cruelty
31. Id. § 54-86n(c).
32. H.B. 5344, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2016) (enacted).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n(b) (West 2016).
34. See, e.g., Steve Pessah, Animal "Advocates" Bill Resurrected in Connecticut Legislature,
Hearing Scheduled 4/1, AM. KENNEL CLUB (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.akc.org/government-rela-
tions/legislative-alerts/connecticut-house-bill-6187.
35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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grounds,36 at least initially opposed the Connecticut law.
37 It listed among
its concerns "the potential for legal confusion about who will be ultimately
responsible for making decisions impacting animals if an advocate partic-
ipates in a case, and providing advocates akin to guardians ad litem that
are traditionally used to protect the interests of minors and other people
lacking legal capacity."38
The Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary Committee released
a report dated March 28, 2016, that reflected opposition from two other
animal-related organizations at that time.39 A representative of the Con-
necticut Federation of Dog Clubs and Responsible Dog Owners, Inc.'s op-
position was described as follows:
The CFD believes this measure is ill advised and should be defeated.
Third party interference with the ownership rights of animal owners
will degrade the rights of all animal owners. Since in the case of animal
cruelty allegations, animal welfare is already overseen by state and lo-
cal officials, appropriate safeguards currently exist to ensure animal
cruelty is identified and punished. This bill is not necessary for the
adjudication process.40
The Connecticut Veterinary Medical Association (CVMA) also op-
posed the bill, at least at that time.4 1 The CVMA representatives' opposi-
tion was described as follows:
Animals already enjoy special legal protections. We have concerns
that the creation of animal advocates may at some point in the future
be used to interfere with medical choices made by an animal owner
and if those choices, although not cruel, are perceived by another as
inadequate[, w]e do not want it to interfere with the veterinary client
relationship in making medical decisions.42
This Essay notes "at least at that time" regarding some groups' oppo-
sition43 because the legislature made a significant amendment to the bill
after the March 2016 Judiciary Committee report that reflected some of
the opposition,44 and the opposition may have been voiced before this sig-
nificant change.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. See Pessah, supra note 34.
38. Id.





43. See supra text accompanying note 41.
44. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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The amendment o the Connecticut bill's language in April 2016 sig-
nificantly lessened, but did not eliminate, the law's slippery-slope poten-
tial. A version of the bill dated April 13, 2016, set forth that the appointed
advocates would "advocate for an animal's best interests or the interests
of justice.'45 Two weeks later, a revised version of the bill dropped the
language addressing advocating for "an animal's best interests," and in-
stead focused only on a charge "to advocate for the interests of justice."46
This revised approach setting forth only that the advocate would represent
the interests of justice is in essence reflected in the law's final version.4 7
As addressed below, assigning an advocate for the interests of justice
is substantially different from, and substantially less problematic than, the
earlier language of advocating for the animal's best interest or the interests
of justice.48 But part of the Act's ongoing slippery-slope risk is that even
with the significantly less dangerous language, the public may believe that
Connecticut has stepped closer to treating animals like humans than is ac-
tually the case. If such misperceptions develop, they could lend an unmer-
ited sense of legitimacy to concepts such as animal legal personhood.
For example, in June 2017, National Public Radio's (NPR) website
published an article entitled In a First, Connecticut's Animals Get Advo-
cates in the Courtroom.49 The article's first sentence read, "A Connecticut
law makes it the first state to provide animals with court-appointed advo-
cates to represent them in abuse and cruelty cases, similar to laws that pro-
vide for victim's or children's advocates."50 Dr. Nancy Halpern, an attor-
ney and veterinarian who writes for the blog Animal Law Update from an
animal welfare perspective, challenged NPR's spin on the Act." She
blogged, "[d]espite that representation, the law is not similar to others
providing for representation of children," and she highlighted the statute's
52sole focus on advocates representing the interests of justice.
45. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: sHB 5344 (Conn. 2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-R000591 -BA.htm.
46. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS AMENDED
BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-R01 0740-BA.htm.
47. The enacted Act's wording is slightly different but essentially the same: in relevant part it
reads "to represent the interests ofjustice." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n (West 2016). The April
27, 2016 version in relevant part read "to advocate for the interests of justice in certain proceedings
involving animals." CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS
AMENDED BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-
R010740-BA.htm.
48. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49. Laurel Wamsley, In a First, Connecticut's Animals Get Advocates in the Courtroom, NPR
(June 2, 2017, 5:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/02/531283235/in-a-first-
connecticuts-animals-get-advocates-in-the-courtroom.
50. Id.
51. Nancy E. Halpern, Connecticut Advocates for Justice, Not Animals, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP





Dr. Halpern's concerns are legitimate. Further, to the extent that the
Act is perceived as making animals more like children in the eyes of the
law, it may be viewed as creating a stepping stone toward the harmful
concept of animal legal personhood. No legal reform may be considered
in complete isolation without regard for how it might influence other po-
tential changes. Thus, the Connecticut Act creates a bit of a slippery slope.
However, its slope is not slippery or steep enough to make support for the
statute unwise, particularly in light of the law's potential benefits for ani-
mal welfare. It presents a slope that should be traversed, but thoughtfully
traversed to limit the risk of harm.
C. The Connecticut Act's Anti-Cruelty Benefits Outweigh Its Risks
As introduced above, while it was still a bill, the Connecticut Act's
originally proposed language was more dangerous than the language the
legislature ultimately adopted. The earlier draft's language that included
advocating for "an animal's best interests" was deleted, and as enacted the
",53
Act focused only on a charge "to advocate for the interests of justice.
Professor Jessica Rubin, who was active in initiating the Act, has ex-
plained that this change was made in response to concerns that allowing
the advocate to represent the interests of the animal "would create legal
standing for animals."54 Professor Rubin wrote:
Initially I was reluctant to accept this change because I feared that it
would weaken the advocate's role. In fact, in practice it has proven to
be an excellent change because the phrase 'interests of justice' allows
consideration of a wider class of interests, including those of commu-
nity safety, other animals and other potential victims.
55
Directing only that the advocate pursue the interests of justice rather
than including advocacy for the best interests of the animal makes the ad-
vocate's role more akin to that of a prosecutor than that of a guardian ad
litem. The Animal Legal Defense Fund recognized this in an article pub-
lished on its website analyzing the Connecticut Act.56 The article noted:
[S]ome have compared the court-appointed advocates allowed under
Desmond's Law [an informal name advocates have used for the law]
to guardians ad litem, who can be appointed by courts to represent the
interests of unborn humans, infants, minors, and mentally incompetent
persons for the duration of a legal proceeding.
57
53. See CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS
AMENDED BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-053
44 -
R010740-BA.htm.
54. JESSICA RUBIN, DESMOND'S LAW: LEGISLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 7
(2017).
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Nicole Pallotta, Unique Connecticut Law Allows Court-Appointed Advocates to Represent





The article responded to these comparisons by noting the following:
Though an important and innovative legal development, the represen-
tation provided for under Desmond's Law seems to stop short of grant-
ing guardian ad litem status. According to the statutory language, ad-
vocates are appointed to represent he "interests of justice" rather than
those of the animal. In this sense, Desmond's Law advocates share the
same responsibility as prosecutors (who also have a duty to act in the
interest of justice in all criminal cases) and does not specifically posi-
tion the advocates as prioritizing the needs of animal victims. How-
ever, the interests of justice are likely to coincide with the interests of
the animal in an abuse case, or will help prevent future victimization
of other animals (e.g. rehoming the animal rather than returning her to
an abusive owner, or sentencing provisions that prohibit a convicted
abuser from having animals for a set period of time).58
The Act's legislative history reflects that much of the testimony of-
fered in support of the Act focused on animal and human welfare argu-
ments rather than on trying to make dogs' and cats' legal statuses akin to
children's legal status. Two recurring themes in testimony provided in sup-
port of the Act were the belief that research resources provided by the vol-
unteers would be helpful to prosecutors and judges in attaining appropriate
convictions, and that more effective prosecutions of animal abusers would
protect against abuse of humans because those who abuse animals often
also abuse humans.59
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA) expressed support illustrative of the first recurring theme. The
ASPCA's support was summarized as follows:
The appointment of court advocates in cruelty law prosecutions would
likely result in proceedings that are more balanced, efficient, and just.
80% of all cases end in withdrawal or dismissal, while 1.5% [of the]
cases are charged as felonies. This is at no cost to the legal system to
quickly obtain and share information with each party and the court.60
The second recurring theme was illustrated by the Connecticut Bar
Association's Animal Law Section.6 1 This group's support was summa-
rized as follows:
This bill will facilitate meaningful outcomes in animal abuse cases.
This is critical because of the significant link between animal abuse
and domestic, as well as other types, of violence. The FBI has recently
decided to collect statistics on animal abuse the way it does for serious
crimes. By appointing an advocate at the court's discretion, the court
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.





has the means to avail itself of more in-depth information related to a
serious offense.62
This theme, which was echoed by multiple other supporters of the
bill, 6 3 reflects a primary rationale relied upon by many states when they
adopted legislation allowing extreme animal abuse to be charged as a fel-
ony rather than as only a misdemeanor. Until fairly recently most states
did not allow severe animal cruelty to be charged as a felony.6 4 However,
by 2014, all states had amended their laws to allow felony charges in ap-
65
propriate cases. Many states justified these enhanced penalties at least in
part based on the threat animal abusers pose to other humans.
66 This re-
flects that the statute is not even solely focused on animal welfare; it is
good for humans as well as for animals.
For several reasons-among them, that the Act provides free legal
resources that may help remedy the very low animal cruelty conviction
rate in Connecticut; that the Act focuses on the broad goal of pursuing the
interests of justice rather than on using the "best interests" paradigm cre-
ated for cases involving children; that attaining convictions for animal
abuse may protect humans from abuse as well; and that under the Act
judges have discretion regarding whether to utilize advocates
67 -in the au-
thor's view, the Connecticut Act's benefits outweigh its limited slippery-
slope risks. The Act is a reminder that despite the foundational differences
between animal welfare supporters and animal rights supporters, in many
instances they may be able to come together regarding practical steps to
help animals.
D. Embracing Legal Reform from an Animal Welfare Perspective
Animal welfare supporters should consider two realities. First, as ad-
dressed above, virtually all animal-protection legal reform entails some
animal rights slippery-slope risks.68 Second, humans' moral responsibility
regarding animals demands that animal welfare advocates support appro-
priate reform to lessen animals' suffering. The two realities connect in
consideration of whether proposed reform is appropriate. In many cases,
such as with the Connecticut advocacy Act, proposed reforms that present
a particularly slippery slope regarding animal personhood can and should
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. (providing statements from several supporters of the bill).
64. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, JURISDICTIONS WITH FELONY ANIMAL ABUSE PROVISIONS
(2012), http://aldf.org/downloads/FelonyStatus List%204-12.pdf.
65. Chris Berry, All 50 States Now Have Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions!, ANIMAL LEGAL
DEF. FUND (Mar. 14, 2014), http://aldf.orgIblog/50-states-now-have-felony-animal-cruelty-provi-
slons.
66. See, e.g., Corwin R. Kruse, Baby Steps: Minnesota Raises Certain Forms ofAnimal Cruelty
to Felony Status, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1668-69 (2002) (asserting that making some forms
of animal cruelty a felony in Minnesota "would have been impossible" absent evidence of a link be-
tween animal cruelty and cruelty toward humans).
67. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n(a) (West 2016).
68. See supra Section II.B.
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be altered to achieve the same concrete benefits for animals. Amending
the Connecticut bill to eliminate the "animal's best interests" language6 9
and to focus on the advocacy for the interests of justice apparently did not
weaken its effectiveness. Further, the amendment significantly lessened
concerns that creating this new kind of statute could be a step toward cre-
ating legal standing for animals.
In addition to thoughtfully balancing the risks and benefits of pro-
posed legal changes regarding animals in deciding what to support, animal
welfare advocates can lessen slippery-slope concerns by communicating
about them. In a 2016 article in the Cincinnati Law Review, the author
highlighted the significance of social scientists' paradigm of "framing" in
communications relating to animals' legal status.7 0 Framing is "to select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a com-
municating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem defini-
tion, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommen-
dation."7 1
The Connecticut Act illustrates the significance of framing in animal
law issues. Framing the Act primarily as a step toward treating animals the
way we treat humans in courts would likely lead to significantly different
perceptions of the law than framing it as providing courts access to helpful
legal research and assistance to further the pursuit of justice in animal cru-
elty cases, while highlighting that the law does not treat animals as per-
sons.
Animal welfare proponents supporting worthy legal reforms such as
the Connecticut Act can mitigate slippery-slope concerns by participating
in the framing process, emphasizing how the reforms are desirable within
an evolving and vibrant animal welfare paradigm. Just as the framing of
sensible animal welfare reforms as steps toward animal rights makes those
reforms more dangerous, framing animal welfare reforms appropriately in
terms of human moral responsibility-rather than as steps toward legal
rights and personhood-lessens the reforms' risks.
In this period of rapid evolution regarding attitudes toward animals,
society is appropriately demanding thoughtful reform, and those commit-
ted to an animal welfare paradigm must heed this call. Failing to walk out
on some slippery slopes would not be good for animals and would lead to
societal irrelevance. It must be recognized that, in addition to the dangers
of walking on slippery slopes, there are costs in avoiding them altogether
69. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS AMENDED
BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-RO 10740-BA.htm.
70. Cupp, supra note 16, at 1038-40.
71. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification ofa Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM.
51, 52 (1993).
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when the slopes are inevitable features of good paths toward an important
72destination.
72. See Cupp, supra note 16, at 1050 (regarding the animal welfare paradigm's need to embrace
evolution despite dangers: "Sometimes treading with thoughtful preparation on a slippery slope may
be safer than trying to permanently stand still on a narrow ledge of a steep cliff.").
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SENTINEL SPECIES: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AS "TERRORISTS," AND WHAT IT
MEANS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TRUMP'S AMERICA
WILL POTTERt
ABSTRACT
The animal rights movement has pioneered new, diverse forms of so-
cial activism that have rapidly redefined how we view animals. But those
remarkable successes have been met with an increasingly aggressive back-
lash, including new terrorism laws, widespread surveillance, experimental
prisons, and legislation explicitly criminalizing journalists and whistle-
blowers. This Article will explain how, if left unchecked, these attacks on
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Much of what we now understand about human survival in extreme
conditions can be traced back to John Scott Haldane.' During the first
world war, the Scottish physiologist traveled to the front to study chlorine
gas used by German forces and then devised makeshift respirators and a
prototype gas mask.2 Haldane also developed a decompression chamber
for British divers returning from deep explorations and a few years later
led a scientific expedition to Pike's Peak in Colorado to study how the
human body responds to high altitude.3 The motto of his aristocratic Scot-
tish family was, poignantly, "suffer," and Haldane saw it as a duty to do
4
so himself because it might protect others from the same fate. For in-
stance, he inhaled toxic chemicals, and instructed his teenage daughter,
stationed outside the room, to come to his aid only if he collapsed.' Biog-
rapher Martin Goodman said Haldane's life was "[t]he greatest sustained
physiological experiment in the history of the human lung."6 Whether it
was war, terrifying depths, or extreme heights, Haldane's life was the ob-
sessive study of how we might survive dangerous environments-and
safely return home.
His most famous work came from his studies of mine disasters.' Hal-
dane would rush to the scene, with his children in tow, and scour the site
for postmortem clues.9 He realized that the greatest threat to the workers
was not a violent blast; it was that we, as a species, are exceptionally
ill-equipped to notice atmospheric changes until it is too late.'o In a
groundbreaking report on his research, Haldane "made suggestions as to
the means by which the lives of those who were outside the immediate
zone of an explosion might be saved, emphasizing the great value of a
mouse or other small animal as an index of the danger."" Those tiny ani-
1. See KC Sekhar & SSC Chakra Rao, John Scott Haldane: The Father of Oxygen Therapy,
58 INDIAN J. ANAESTHESIA 350, 350-52 (2014).
2. Kat Eschner, The Man Who Invented the First Gas Mask, SMITHSONIAN.COM (May 3,
2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/man-who-invented-first-gas-mask.
3. C. Gordon Douglas et al., Physiological Observations Made on Pike's Peak, Colorado, with
Special Reference to Adaptation to Low Barometric Pressures, 203 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
Soc'Y LONDON B 185, 185-86 (1913).
4. MARTIN GOODMAN, SUFFER AND SURVIVE: GAS ATTACKS, MINERS' CANARIES,
SPACESUITS AND THE BENDS: THE EXTREME LIFE OF DR. J.S. HALDANE 53 (Simon & Schuster Ltd.
2007).
5. Id. at 164.
6. Id. at 44.
7. See Sekhar & Rao, supra note 1.
8. Andy Meharg, One-Man Canary, 449 NATURE 981, 981 (2007) (book review).
9. See id.
10. C. G. Douglas, John Scott Haldane, in 2 OBITUARY NOTICES OF FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL




mals are what environmental and medical-health scientists describe as sen-
tinel species.12 Haldane learned to monitor vulnerable elements in any en-
vironment, for the canaries becoming ill is an early warning system of our
fate.
First Amendment law, and more broadly the defense of civil liberties,
depends upon a constant examination of such sentinel species: the protest-
ers, the radicals, and those on society's fringes. Through their acts of dis-
sent, they reflect the quality of the atmosphere for the rest of us. If they
lack the air they need to march, protest, and engage in nonviolent civil
disobedience, it is a warning that other political advocates should heed.
The freedoms of the marginal and vulnerable are a measurement of the
health of our democracy.
For nearly twenty years my research has documented the govern-
ment's domestic terrorism operations, and I have found that one social
movement has been the target of repressive measures post-9/11 more than
any other.14 Animal rights and environmental activists have pioneered
new, diverse forms of social activism that have exposed widespread indus-
try cruelty and environmental abuses; ushered in new legal standards; de-
railed multinational corporations; and rapidly redefined how we view an-
imals and the natural world. These remarkable successes have been met
with increasingly harsh repression, including new terrorism and censor-
ship laws, widespread surveillance, ambitious civil and criminal lawsuits,
disproportionate prison sentences, and experimental prison units." The
corporate-led backlash against these social movements has become a blue-
print of how to repress protest groups in the modern era, and identical tac-
tics have now been used against other contemporary social movements,
both in the United States and internationally.16 In short, these activists are
a sentinel species of protester. If we miss their warning signs, we will be
faced with a much broader criminalization of dissent.
I. MEET THE WORLD'S NEWEST TERRORIST
This political climate did not emerge spontaneously after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, as one might think.17 The campaigns to label pro-
test as terrorism had been building for decades." In the early 1980s, the
animal rights and environmental movements were growing quickly and
12. David L. Wheeler, A Scholar Uses Bees as a 'Sentinel Species'to Track the Path ofPollu-
tants, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 16, 1998, at A 16.
13. See Sekhar & Rao, supra note 1.
14. See WILL POTTER, GREEN IS THE NEW RED: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT UNDER SIEGE 46 (2011).
15. See Will Potter, The Secret US Prisons You've Never Heard ofBefore, TED, (Aug. 2015),
https://www.ted.com/talks/willpotter thesecret-usprisons you ve neverheardofbefore.
16. See, e.g., Will Potter, Attack on Factory Farm Whistleblowers Goes Global, DODO (Feb.
16, 2014), https://www.thedodo.com/attack-on-factory-farm-whistle-432282967.html.
17. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
2018] 879
DENVER LAWREVIEW
boldly.1 9 They had widespread popular support, even for their more radical
tactics.20 Groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) were breaking
into animal experimentation laboratories and fur farms, rescuing ani-
mals.2 1 National organizations like People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) used video footage obtained by these groups in their law-
ful campaigns.2 2 When ALF activists rescued a primate named Britches
who had his eyes sewn shut in sight-deprivation experiments, they turned
over the footage anonymously to PETA. 2 3 PETA used it for advocacy cam-
paigns, sent it to media, and pressured politicians.
24
Major media outlets reported favorably on these protest tactics, call-
ing the activists "heroes."2 5 One Los Angeles Times article in 1986, for
example, was headlined, Environmental 'Warriors' Use Radical Tactics
to Make Point.26 It praised environmentalists locking their bodies to bull-
dozers, spiking trees to sabotage timber sales, and employing other Ed-
ward Abbey-style monkeywrenching.27 The press and the public loved
these radicals.28
For the corporations targeted, though, the activists were a serious
problem.29 These protest tactics were changing the public discussion.
30 A
unified social movement with broad popular support and a willingness to
act represented an immediate threat to profits. To protect their business,
corporations needed to displace these activists from their moral high
ground and demonize them in the eyes of the public.
31 Their plan of attack
was quite brilliant; it relied on the power of language.
3 2 As Aldous Huxley,
the author of Brave New World, wrote in one of his essays, "[t]he propa-
gandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets
of people are human."33 Corporations needed to reframe how protesters
19. William Robbins, Animal Rights: A Growing Movement in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 15,1984,
at Al.
20. Lisa Levitt Ryckman, Environmental 'Warriors' Use Radical Tactics to Make Point, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1986, at 3.
21. Animal Liberation Front, Introducing the Animal Liberation Front, in TERRORISTS OR
FREEDOM FIGHTERS?: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIBERATION OF ANIMALS 7-8 (Steven Best & Anthony
J. Nocella 11 eds., 2004).
22. Ben A. Franklin, Going to Extremes for 'Animal Rights,'N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1987, at E7.
23. Britches' Story: Eyes Sewn Shut, PETA, https://www.peta.org/videos/britches-story-eyes-
sewn-shut (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
24. See id.
25. Richard R. Knabel, Opinion, Bureaucracy and the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1986,
at WC11.
26. Ryckman, supra note 20.
27. Id.
28. See id
29. See Jim Robbins, Saboteurs for a Better Environment, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1989, at E6.
30. Id.
31. See Ron Arnold, Eco-Terrorism, REASON (Feb. 1983), https://reason.com/ar-
chives/I 983/02/01 /eco-terrorism.
32. See generally POTTER, supra note 14 (providing a detailed history on the term eco-terrorist).
33. ALDOUS HUXLEY, THE OLIVE TREE AND OTHER ESSAYS 99 (reprt. 1960).
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were perceived, so in 1985, industry groups created a new word: "eco-ter-
rorist." 3 4 They just made it up.35 They knew that if they could control the
terms of the debate, then they could shift public perception of these activ-
ists so that we no longer saw them as "heroes" or "warriors," and not even
"saboteurs" or "monkey-wrenchers."36 Instead, the public would call them
"terrorists."3 7
Over the next several decades, corporations used this language re-
lentlessly in media campaigns.38 One ad from the fur industry in the 1980s
proclaimed, "Meet the world's newest terrorist." 39 It pictured a figure in a
black ski mask wielding an axe.40 Underneath the image it said, "Don't
tolerate terrorism in America. Fur is for life."41 Thirty years later, the same
imagery is still being used.42 Industry groups hired public-relations firms
to insert eco-terrorism into the national security dialogue.43 The Clorox
Corporation, for instance, hired Ketchum Public Relations in 1991 to de-
velop a crisis-management plan; among Ketchum's recommended tactics
44was a "Stop Environmental Terrorism" media campaign.
An essential component of this media manipulation has been seizing
every available opportunity to repeat the eco-terrorist language.45 For in-
stance, when the popular children's movie Hoot was released in theaters
in 2006, industry groups sent out press releases calling it "soft-core
eco-terrorism for kids."46 When the iconic children's book Charlotte's
Web was adapted for film, the Center for Consumer Freedom warned par-
ents "images prodding your kids toward the multiplex might be more about
animal rights than E.B. White."47 James Cameron's Avatar, about indige-
nous blue aliens who defended their home from developers, was dubbed a
"recruiting film for eco-terrorists."48 No matter how absurd all of this
34. See generally POTTER, supra note 14.
35. Lawrence Buell, What Is Called Ecoterrorism, 16 GRAMMA: J. THEORY & CRITICISM 153,
156 (2009).
36. Id. at 154-64.
37. Id. at 156.
38. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
39. Advertisement (on file with author).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Will Potter, Green-Scaremongers Place Anonymous New York Times Ad, GREEN IS THE
NEW RED (May 1, 2006), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/nyt-ad.
43. See ANDREW ROWELL, GREEN BACKLASH: GLOBAL SUBVERSION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 81-82, 112, 150-51, 247 (1996).
44. Circling the Wagons: One P.R. Firm's Offensive Strategy, GREENPEACE MAO., July/Aug.
1991, at 6.
45. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
46. Marc Morano, New Movie Called 'Soft Core Eco-Terrorism'for Kids, CYBERCAST NEWS
SERV. (May 1, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20080213141840/http://www.cnsnews.com/View-
Print.asp?Page=/SpecialReports/archive/200605/SPE20060501a.html.
47. Charlotte's (Tangled) Web, CTR. FOR CONSUMER FREEDOM (Dec. 7, 2006),
https://www.consumerfreedom.com/2006/12/3194-charlottes-tangled-web.
48. Waylon Lewis, Is Avatar a "Recruiting Film for Eco Terrorists?," HUFFPOST (Mar. 18,




sounds, claims such as this were published in national media outlets, and
the new rhetoric of eco-terrorism continued to spread.4 9
As press releases and public-relations campaigns inserted this new
language into the public dialogue, corporations such as GlaxoSmithKline
50
and trade associations such as the Center for Consumer Freedom 5 were
pressuring lawmakers to hold congressional hearings. Much like the stra-
tegic creations of political spectacle by Senator Joseph McCarthy during
the anticommunist hysteria of the Red Scare, these congressional hearings
were designed to attract media attention. They were sensational and in-
flammatory and made international headlines.52 There was a complete ab-
sence of critical press examinations into this new "terrorism," and who
was behind it. With each subsequent story, this made-up label was used in
headlines and articles, legitimizing this repression.
II. NUMBER ONE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT
The unwillingness of the press to challenge this eco-terrorism rheto-
ric, combined with the aggressive lobbying efforts of special-interest
groups, set the stage for a radical assault on the civil liberties of these so-
cial movements. On September 11, as emergency crews were still attempt-
ing to rescue people from the Twin Towers, some politicians were already
exploiting the tragedy and claiming that the terrorist attack was the work
of environmentalists.5 3 On September 12, 2001, Representative Greg Wal-
den, a Republican from Oregon, said that "eco-terrorists" posed a threat
"no less heinous than what we saw occur yesterday here in Washington
and in New York."5 4 The next month, the Washington Times called for war
against the "eco-al-Qaeda."5 5 Kimberley Strassel of the Wall Street Jour-
nal heralded a new political climate for neutralizing activists as "eco-ter-
rorists."5 6 "The indulgent world in which these groups had operated col-
lapsed on Sept[ember] 11," she wrote.57
49. See, e.g., id
50. See The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16-19 (2006)
[hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of William Trundley, Vice President, Global Corporate Secu-
rity and Investigations, GlaxoSmithKline).
51. Full Committee Hearing: Eco-Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub.
Works, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of David Martosko, Director of
Research, Center for Consumer Freedom).
52. Shaun Waterman, Analysis: New Animal Rights Terror Law, UPI DEF. NEWS (Nov. 29,
2006, 10:56 AM), https://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Security-Industry/2006/l 1/29/Analysis-
New-animal-rights-terror-law/UPI-34661164815778.
53. See, e.g., Walden: Earth Liberation Front a Threat, CONGRESSDAILY, Sept. 12, 2001, at
12.
54. Id.
55. War Against Eco-Terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2001), https://www.washington-
times.com/news/2001/oct/7/20011007-025834-9663r.
56. Kimberley A. Strassel, Opinion, Left Behind: These Are Lean Times for Fringe Activists,
WALL STREET J., (Oct. 4, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122393012




Post-9/1 1, warnings of eco-terrorism saturated mainstream media.
Travis Wagner, a professor of environmental science and policy at the
University of Southern Maine, has studied how national newspapers por-
tray these activists.5 9 Examining top-tier newspaper articles from 1984
through 2006, he found that terrorism rhetoric appeared throughout the
timeline, but its frequency increased dramatically after September 11 and
has continued climbing since then.60 Wagner noted that this increase in
ecotage-related stories accompanied a decline in actual crimes.61 Accord-
ing to the North American Animal Liberation Press Office-not one to
downplay radical activism-crimes decreased by forty-seven percent after
September 11.62 As warnings of eco-terrorism made headlines, the threat
itself waned.
Eventually, this language worked its way into the top levels of gov-
ernment.4 "'The No. 1 domestic terrorism threat is the eco-terrorism, an-
imal-rights movement,' said John Lewis, an FBI deputy assistant director
and top official in charge of domestic terrorism [in 2005].",6' Even in their
most militant and potentially dangerous actions, the FBI acknowledges
that so-called eco-terrorists have never harmed a single human being and
their codes of conduct include rohibitions against acts that harm "any an-
imal, human and nonhuman."6 Yet the FBI listed an alleged animal rights
fugitive on its "most wanted terrorists" list alongside Osama bin Laden,
sending a very clear message to the public and the press about law enforce-
ment's priorities and institutionalizing this new terrorism framework.6 7
III. MOBILIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT
Within the FBI, the characterization of animal rights and environ-
mental activists as terrorists, and designation of their protest activity as a
58. Travis Wagner, Reframing Ecotage as Ecoterrorism: News and the Discourse of Fear, 2
ENVTL. COMM. 1, 25, 32-34 (2008).
59. Id. at 26-27.
60. Id. at 32-34.
61. Id at 34.
62. N. AM. ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT PRESS OFFICE, 2001 YEAR-END DIRECT ACTION
REPORT 9 (2002).
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
65. Henry Schuster, Domestic Terror: Who's Most Dangerous?, CNN (Aug. 24, 2005, 2:14
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/24/schuster.column; see FBI: Eco-Terrorism Remains No. I
Domestic Terror Threat, FOX NEWS (Mar. 31, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/03/31/fbi-
eco-terrorism-remains-no-I-domestic-terror-threat.
66. The Threat ofEco-Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Res. Comm., Subcomm. On Forests &
Forest Health, 107f Cong. (2002) (statement of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Section Chief,
Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
67. See Vivian Ho, Daniel Andreas San Diego Listed on FBIs Most Wanted, SFGATE (Dec.
13, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Daniel-Andreas-San-Diego-listed-on-FBI-
s-most-5062632.php; see also Juliet Eilperin, As Eco-Terrorism Wanes, Governments Still Target Ac-





counter-terrorism priority, has been institutionalized. One way that these
priorities have become entrenched is through FBI training materials for
new agents.69 In documents obtained through the Freedom of Information
Act-the U.S. open records law-the FBI's training materials on "eco-ter-
rorism" are not about violence.70 They are about a "public relations war."
7
The FBI lists lawful First Amendment activity and low-level criminal ac-
tivity (such as nonviolent civil disobedience) as examples of domestic ter-
rorism by animal advocates, and pays special attention to how these groups
use information in their campaigns.7 2 Examples of information gathering
listed by the FBI include requests for public documents under the Freedom
of Information Act. Open records requests are listed as examples of
"[u]niversity targeting."74 The FBI also warns of activist attempts to use
"false employment," which is clearly in reference to activists who seek
employment at factory farms for the purpose of undercover investiga-
tions.
The training materials summarize the threat of animal advocates in
bulleted points:
o Media is vital part of every action [sic]
o Media sometimes slanted in favor of activists
" Celebrities support & fund AR/Eco movement
o Activists spin the truth.
76
I discussed the FBI's training materials with former FBI agent Mike
German, who has worked undercover infiltrating right-wing groups for the
bureau. Law enforcement considers political activists to be a terrorism
threat, he said, "[b]ecause the FBI appears to be training them to believe
there is one using factually flawed materials."
78
68. See Will Potter, Newly Released FBI "Domestic Terrorism" Training on Anarchists, Envi-










77. Michael German, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/expert/mike-
german (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
78. Potter, supra note 68 (quoting Michael German, Manufacturing a "Black Separatist"
Threat and Other Dubious Claims: Bias in Newly Released FBI Terrorism Training Materials, ACLU




These instructions for law enforcement are also coming from
for-profit corporations.7 9 TransCanada, the company building the $5.3 bil-
lion Keystone XL oil pipeline, has been the target of a diverse protest cam-
paign against the 2,000-mile project, including environmental lawsuits,
tree sits and blockades, and civil disobedience at the White House.80 In
response, TransCanada has held daylong "strategy meeting[s]" and "train-
ing session[s]" with the FBI about how to best protect the corporation from
environmental protests.8 1
Documents obtained through open records laws have also revealed
that TransCanada has delivered PowerPoint presentations to law enforce-
ment in which corporate representatives identified protesters by name and
photo and instructed police how they should go about prosecuting them as
terrorists.82 The presentation includes publicly available photos from or-
ganization websites and background information on "Tar Sands Blockade
Leadership: Professionals [sic] Organizers."83 Scott Parkin, for example,
is described as a "professional activist." 84 He is a senior campaigner for
the Rainforest Action Network, a nonprofit environmental group de-
scribed by Forbes magazine as experts in "how to get under the skin of
big business."as TransCanada's presentation warns that he "conducts most
of the Non Violent Direct Action training"86 and that his colleague, Rae
Breaux, is an "'expert rock climber and trainer for Tree Sitting projects'
and 'has presented speeches."'87
TransCanada does not cite any protester violence in its presentation
and acknowledges that none has occurred.8 Instead, the company warns
79. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
80. Steven Mufson, KeystoneXL Pipeline Opponents Turn to Civil Disobedience, WASH. POST
(Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/keystone-xl-pipeline-oppo-
nents-tum-to-civil-disobedience/2012/10/15/2d0a8310-16e5-1 1e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4bstory.
81. Adam Federman, FBI Held 2012 Strategy Meeting with TransCanada, Industry Partners,
EARTH ISLAND J. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.earthisland.org/joumal/in-
dex.php/elist/eListRead/fbiheld_2012_strategy meetingwithtranscanadaindustrypartners.
82. Isaac Arnsdorf, Big Oil's Fight for Keystone XL Includes Tracking Critics, Activists,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015, 5:28 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/news/big-oils-fight-for-key-
stone-xl-includes-tracking-critics-activists.
83. Will Potter, TransCanada Is Secretly Briefing Police About Keystone XL Protests and Urg-
ing Terrorism Prosecutions, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (June 12, 2013), http://www.greenisthe-
newred.com/blog/transcanada-police-presentation-on-protests (quoting TransCanada Presentation,
DESMOG, https://www.desmogblog.com/sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/TransCanada%2OProtest-
ing%20Pipeline%2OCriminal%2OCharges.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) [hereinafter TransCanada
Presentation]).
84. Id. (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
85. Marc Gunther, The Mosquito in the Tent: A Pesky Environmental Group Called the Rain-
forest Action Network Is Getting Under the Skin of Corporate America, FORTUNE, May 31, 2004, at
158.
86. Potter, supra note 83 (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
87. Id. (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
88. Joyce Nelson, Hardball Tactics, Co-operation from CSIS Give TransCanada Edge over





of nonviolent civil disobedience and "landowner court challenges" as ex-
amples of "potential security concerns."
89 In Oklahoma, "a protester
walked into the lane of a slow moving vehicle," and in Texas there have
been "demonstrations/protest activity," "tree houses," "banners," and "so-
cial media organization."90 In Nebraska, where this briefing took place,
there has been "protest/demonstrations" and "opposition attendance" at
public meetings.9 1 "Another slide on activist motivation describes the type
of people TransCanada fears. The first quotation says, 'I have been an ac-
tivist for fifty years. I am seventy.' 92
What is particularly troubling about this presentation is that a corpo-
ration is briefing law enforcement about who, when, why, and how they
should prosecute. "TransCanada offers police a playbook on how to go
after activists. The[] company suggests prosecuting using criminal tres-
pass, criminal conspiracy, criminal instrument or device (the [plastic pipes
and barrels] used for nonviolent civil disobedience), grand juries, and 'fed-
eral/state anti-terrorism statues [sic]."'9 3
One of the final slides of the presentation is particularly revealing in
terms of what is at stake here. The list of "Potential Security Concerns"
includes:
o Gulf Coast Project - recent media attention.
o Keystone XL - media, high profile.
94
Much like the FBI materials, the emphasis is on public exposure
through the media.95 TransCanada is not pleading with law enforcement
to crack down on property destruction or violence because that is not what
this campaign is about.9 6 The campaign against the Keystone XL pipeline
has resulted in widespread public support and positive media coverage
about people willing to nonviolently put their bodies on the line.
97 The
89. Elana Schor, TransCanada Prepped Local Police for Prosecuting Pipeline Foes, E&E
NEWS (June 11, 2013, 2:50 PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/10599
8 2 6 32 .
90. Potter, supra note 83 (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
91. Id. (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
92. Id. (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83).
93. Mat McDermott, According to KeystoneXL Companies, Activists May Really Be Terrorists,
MOTHERBOARD (June 18, 2013, 2:05 PM) (quoting TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83 (altera-
tion in original)), https://motherboard.vice.com/enus/article/vvva8dlaccording-to-keystone-xl-com-
panies-activists-may-really-be-terrorists.
94. TransCanada Presentation, supra note 83.
95. See id.
96. See id
97. See, e.g., Zach Pluhacek, Keystone XL Opponents Vow "Civil Disobedience" to Stop Pro-
ject, COLUMBUS TELEGRAM (Aug. 10, 2017), http://columbustelegram.com/news/state-and-re-
gional/keystone-xl-opponents-vow-civil-disobedience-to-stop-project/article e4cOb4fl -3b48-5c3f-
90c5-07a5db8ef691.htm; see also, e.g., 7 Arrested in Polk Co. Pipeline Protest, KTRE,
http://www.ktre.com/story/19400667/7-arrested-in-polk-co-pipeline-protest (last visited Apr. 20,





campaign inspired the Sierra Club to break with tradition and engage in
nonviolent civil disobedience for the first time in the history of the organ-
* 98ization.
TransCanada officials says this is why they needed to hire a new pub-
lic-relations fim. 99 "One of the issues we have had since the fall of 2010
is trying to rebut what our opponents are saying . . . This takes resources,
and we have been dwarfed by the content the activists have and are posting
online with respect to Keystone XL." 100
IV. ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM
With the new rhetoric of terrorism firmly in place, and "eco-terror-
ism" regularly part of media and political dialogue, corporations began
chipping away at constitutionally protected protest activity with a variety
of legal and legislative tactics.101 They have brought the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)-the law intended to be
used for the mob-actions against animal rights campaigners.102 They
have sought restraining orders and injunctions to stop protests.103 And they
have introduced a long list of local, state, and federal legislation to target
their opposition.1 0 4 By far the most significant development in this effort,
though, was the creation of the crime of "animal enterprise terrorism."
The Animal Enterprise Protection Act 05 is federal law passed in
1992, after heavy lobbying by animal industries, ostensibly to crack down
on illegal, underground actions by groups like the Animal Liberation
Front.106 Years later, the law was used to prosecute the SHAC 7, who were
members of an international campaign to stop the notorious animal testing
lab, Huntingdon Life Sciences.107 Multiple undercover investigations re-
98. Sierra Club to Engage in Civil Disobedience for the First Time in Organization's History
to Stop Tar Sands, SIERRA CLUB (Jan. 22, 2013), https://content.sierraclub.org/press-re-
leases/2013/01/sierra-club-engage-civil-disobedience-first-time-organizations-history.
99. Shawn McCarthy, Greenpeace Sees "Dirty Tricks" in PR Firm's TransCanada Plan,
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-
news/energy-and-resources/greenpeace-sees-dirty-tricks-in-pr-firms-transcanada-plan/arti-
cle21630761.
100. Amy Harder, TransCanada Steps Up Defense of Keystone XL Pipeline, NAT'L J. (Jun. 12,
2013), https://www.nationaljoumal.com/s/77961/transcanada-steps-up-defense-keystone-xl-pipeline.
101. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Rokke, 986 F. Supp. 982, 984-85 (E.D. Va. 1997).
103. See Commonwealth v. Gazzola, No. 02-11098, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 28, at *6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2004).
104. See Jen Fifield, Farmers Push BackAgainstAnimal Welfare Laws, PEW CHARITABLE TR.
(Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/11/29/farm-
ers-push-back-against-animal-welfare-laws.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2012).
106. See House Hearing, supra note 50, at 5 (statement of Brent J. McIntosh, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice); Senate Hearing, supra note 51 (state-
ment of John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation).
107. David Kocieniewski, Six Animal Rights Advocates Are Convicted of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at B3; see Brief of Amici Curiae for Center for Constitutional Rights and First
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vealed lab workers punching beagle puppies and dissecting living mon-
keys.'0 8 The SHAC 7 were never accused of participating in underground
activity, though.109 They spoke and wrote about it and published news of
both legal and illegal protest activity on their website."o According to
prosecutors, this web publishing created a political climate that encour-
aged illegal acts, so they were indicted on conspiracy to commit animal
enterprise terrorism and conspiracy to harass using a telecommunications
device (the internet) charges."' They were sentenced to between four and
six years in prison."2
As the SHAC 7 were awaiting sentencing, their corporate opposi-
tion-dozens of pharmaceutical and biotech companies secretly united as
the "Animal Enterprise Protection Coalition"-was lobbying for even
more sweeping powers.'13 I was invited to testify before the U.S. Congress
in 2006 about the proposal, called the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act,"
4
which radically expanded the Animal Enterprise Protection Act.'
15 At the
hearing, the Justice Department told lawmakers that the law did not go far
enough and that it was impossible to crack down on extremists-despite
the successful prosecution of activists for First Amendment activity under
the existing, more narrowly constructed law.1
6 Brent McIntosh, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, testified that "animal rights extremists have
tailored their campaigns to exploit limits and ambiguities in the statute,"
adding that "the bill under consideration today would fill gaps in the cur-
rent law."' 17
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act was passed in 2006 with bipar-
tisan support-and extensive lobbying by Pfizer; Wyeth; Glax-
osmithkline; the egg, meat, and dairy industries; Ringling Brothers; the
Fur Commission; and many other "animal enterprises."" There are three
Amendment Lawyers Ass'n in Support of Petitioners at 2, United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d
Cir. 2009) (No. 10-7187).
108. See Gina Kolata, Tough Tactics in One Battle over Animals in the Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1998, at E l.
109. See Chris Maag, America's #1 Threat: The Latest Front in the "War on Terror": Ani-
mal-Rights Activists, MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2006), https://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2006/0 1/americas-I-threat.
110. Senate Hearing, supra note 51.
111. See U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DIST. OF N.J., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THREE
MILITANT ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS SENTENCED TO BETWEEN FOUR AND SIX YEARS IN PRISON 2-
4 (2006).
112. Id. at 2.
113. Will Potter, Internal Industry Documents Show Plans for Labeling Activists as "Eco-Ter-
rorists" (Part 1), GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.greenisthe-
newred.com/blog/internal-industry-documents-show-plans-for-labeling-activists-as-eco-terrorists.
114. S. 3880, 109th Cong. § 1(2006).
115. See House Hearing, supra note 50, at 20 (testimony of William Potter, Journalist).
116. See id. at 8-9 (prepared statement of Brent J. McIntosh, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office
of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice); see also Kocieniewski, supra note 107 (confirming that
the prosecution of activists was successful).
117. House Hearing, supra note 50, at 5-6 (statement of Brent J. McIntosh, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice).
118. Potter, supra note 113.
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ways to be prosecuted under the expanded law: damaging or causing the
loss of any property (which is later defined as including the loss of profits),
instilling a reasonable fear in those being protested, and conspiracy.''9
This vague, overly broad language is especially troubling in light of the
political climate corporations have created through public-relations cam-
paigns and advertising, and the lack of consistency within government
agencies in the classification of terrorist groups.12 0 How can we possibly
describe "reasonable fear" when industries are campaigning to make the
unreasonable reasonable?
When I testified in opposition to the Animal Enterprise Terrorism
Act, the primary concern I raised was that the law would have a chilling
effect on lawful protest activity.121 It would contribute to a growing cli-
mate of fear being used to deter free speech and advocacy.12 2 The law does
not explicitly outlaw protest, but it makes people afraid of using their
rights, lest they be labeled a terrorist.' 23 In addition, the vague language of
the law could be used to wrap up a wide range of activities that threaten
corporate profits, such as nonviolent undercover investigations and whis-
tleblowing.124 Members of Congress angrily dismissed such arguments,
saying the law was tailored to illegal, underground groups.125 Whistle-
blowers and lawful protesters would never be affected, they said: the law
would only be used against people who do things like burn buildings.126
Unfortunately, my concerns about the law turned out to be true.127
The first use of the new law, in 2008, did not involve arson.128 A group of
protesters in California were prosecuted as terrorists for protesting outside
of animal experimenters' homes with signs and bullhorns, and writing pro-
test slogans on the street using children's sidewalk chalk.129 That prosecu-
tion was dismissed when the judge agreed that the government had not
revealed enough about what, exactly, the activists had allegedly done to
warrant terrorism charges.130 It was an important victory, but the prosecu-
tion itself instilled widespread fear in activist communities that anyone
could be prosecuted as a terrorist for lawful protest activity.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2) (2012).
120. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42536, THE DOMESTIC TERRORIST
THREAT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013).
121. See House Hearing, supra note 50, at 21 (statement of William Potter, Journalist).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 22 (prepared statement of William Potter, Journalist).
125. See id at 26-27 (statement of Rep. Tom Feeney).
126. See id.
127. See Will Potter, FBI Arrests 4 Activists as "Terrorists "for Chalking Slogans, Leafleting,
and Protesting, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Feb. 22, 2009), http://www.greenisthe-
newred.com/blog/aeta-arrests.
128. See id.
129. United States v. Buddenberg, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-
do/our-cases/united-states-v-buddenberg (last visited June 9, 2018).
130. Will Potter, Breaking: AETA 4 Case Dismissed, but Re-indictment Possible, GREEN IS THE
NEW RED (July 12, 2010), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/aeta-4-case-thrown-out-dismissed.
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Similarly, statements that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
would never be used against undercover investigators were later revealed
to be dishonest. 13 1 The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force has kept files on
activists who expose animal welfare abuses on factory farms and recom-
mended prosecuting them as terrorists, according to a document uncovered
through the Freedom of Information Act.132 As I first reported on Green-
IsTheNewRed.com:
The 2003 FBI file details the work of several animal rights activists
who used undercover investigations to document repeated animal[-
]welfare violations. The FBI special agent who authored the report said
they "illegally entered buildings owned by [redacted] Farm ... and
videotaped conditions of animals." The animal activists caused "eco-
nomic loss" to businesses, the FBI [argued]. And they also openly res-
cued several animals from the abusive conditions. This was not done
covertly in the style of underground groups like the Animal Liberation
Front-it was an act of nonviolent civil disobedience and, as the FBI
agent note[d], the activists distributed press releases and conducted
media interviews taking responsibility for their actions. Based on these
acts-trespassing in order to photograph and videotape abuses on fac-
tory farms-the agent conclude[d] there "is a reasonable indication"
that the activists [committed "animal enterprise terrorism."]
1 33
"It is deeply sobering to see one's name in an FBI file proposing ter-
rorism charges," said Ryan Shapiro, a doctoral candidate at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, in an email interview. He went on to say:
It is even more sobering to realize the supposedly terroristic activities
in question are merely exposing the horrific cruelty of factory farms,
educating the public about what goes on behind those closed doors,
and openly rescuing a few animals from one of those farms as an act
of civil disobedience.1
34
Most people never heard about the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act,
including members of Congress. It passed the Senate in the middle of the
night, with no discussion or debate.135 In the House, the bill was snuck
through on the very first day back from congressional recess.'
1 6 The Ani-
131. See Will Potter, FBI Says Activists Who Investigate Factory Farms Can Be Prosecuted as





135. See 152 CONG. REC. S10793-94 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
136. See 152 CONG. REC. H8594 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2006).
[Vol. 95:4890
SENTINEL SPECIES
mal Enterprise Terrorism Act was passed as part of the suspension calen-
dar,1 37 which is a procedure used to expeditiously deal with noncontrover-
sial legislation.' 3 8 That week, the procedure was also used to honor the St.
Louis Cardinals for winning the World Series.'3 9 Only one percent of law-
makers were in the room for the vote.140 The rest were outside at a new
memorial.141 They were praising Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., as his style
of nonviolent civil disobedience was being labeled terrorism-if done in
the name of protecting animals.142
V. FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM: "AG-GAG" LAWS
Over time, the focus of these anti-activist campaigns shifted from the
more militant, grassroots animal rights groups to mainstream, national
nonprofit organizations, including the Humane Society of the United
States, Mercy For Animals, Compassion Over Killing, and the American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). New laws are
being created that explicitly target undercover investigations by these or-
ganizations or anyone who photographs or videotapes animal cruelty or
environmental pollution on industrial farms. 143
In one such investigation in California, the Humane Society of the
United States documented cows too sick to even walk-so common that
they are called "downers" by the industry 44 -entering the food supply.1 45
Workers at the Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company were using
heavy machinery to push cows into the "kill box" so that they could be
slaughtered.146 Workers were recorded beating and kicking the cows, ap-
plying electric shocks, and stabbing them with the blades of a forklift. 14 7
The slaughterhouse was the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) se-
cond-largest supplier and was named a "supplier of the year" for 2004-
137. Id.
138. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32474, SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2005).
139. See 152 CONG. REC., H8651 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2006) (statement of Rep. Foxx).
140. Will Potter, Lobbying Documents Show How Corporations Snuck "Eco-Terrorism" Law
Through Congress (Part 2), GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.greenisthe-
newred.com/blog/lobbying-documents-show-how-corporations-snuck-eco-terrorism-law-through-
congress.
141. See Associated Press, Bush, Others at King Memorial Groundbreaking, NBC NEWS.COM
(Nov. 13, 2006, 1:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15699682/ns/usnews-life/t/bush-others-
king-memorial-groundbreaking.
142. See 152 CONG. REC. H8590-92 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Scott).
143. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-is-becoming-the-
crime.html.
144. JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-905, AGRICULTURE: A GLOSSARY OF
TERMS, PROGRAMS, AND LAWS 80 (2005).






2005.148 These sick animals would have been fed to school children in
thirty-six states as part of the USDA's national school-lunch program.149
The exposure of these practices prompted the recall of 143 million pounds
of meat,15 o the largest meat recall in U.S. history.15 1
Rather than by condemning these abuses, changing their policies, and
responding to consumer demand, the agriculture industry has responded
by attempting to shoot the messenger.152 The industry has labeled whistle-
blowers as "terrorists" and supported new laws to silence them.
53
"Ag-gag" laws-"ag" is for agriculture, "gag" is to silence-are an ex-
plicit attempt to outlaw undercover investigations and whistleblowing if
they negatively portray the industry.154 These proposals-introduced in
twenty-eight states, passed into law in eight 1 55 -eliminate the only mean-
ingful oversight of this massive industry and allow it to continue operating
without oversight or accountability.
Laws with provisions similar to ag-gag have existed since the early
1990s.156 In Montana, North Dakota, and Kansas, "agricultural interfer-
ence" laws include outright bans on photography and video recording.1
57
Each includes similar language, against those who "[e]nter an animal fa-
cility and use or attempt to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video
or audio recording equipment."158 These laws remained on the books and
set a legal precedent, but they were not enforced.159 Undercover investiga-
tions were simply not as common as they are today.
As undercover investigations became more frequent and effective,
and as the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act became law, the animal-agri-
culture industry began targeting investigators as terrorists.160 In California,
148. Hallmark/Westland Meat Recall: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appro-
priations, I10th Cong. 37 (2008) (statement of Wayne Pacelle, President and CEO, The Humane So-
ciety of the U.S.).
149. Joe Roybal, California Nightmare, BEEF (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.beefmaga-
zine.com/beef-quality/cattle-handling/california-nightmare.
150. Associated Press, USDA Recalls 143 Million Pounds of Beef, NBC NEWS.coM (Mar. 3,
2008, 10:39 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/23212514.
151. David Brown, USDA Orders Largest Meat Recall in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Feb. 18,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2 0 0 8/02/17/AR2008021701530.html.
152. See Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws Restricting Undercover In-
vestigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960, 10965 (2012).
153. Id.
154. What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-cen-
ter/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislationi/ag-gag-bills-state-level (last visited June 9, 2018).
155. Id.
156. See Alicia Prygoski, BriefSummary ofAg-Gag Laws, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST.
CTR. (2015), https://www.animallaw.info/article/brief-summary-ag-gag-aws.
157. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(e) (2017); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02(6) (2017).
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02(6); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 81-30-103(e).
159. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & DEFENDING RIGHTS & DISSENT, AG-GAG ACROSS
AMERICA: CORPORATE-BACKED ATTACKS ON ACTIVISTS AND WHISTLEBLOWERS 12 (2017).




for example, an investigation by Compassion Over Killing of Central Val-
ley Meat Company revealed such extreme cruelty that the government ac-
tually shut down the slaughterhouse.6 ' This type of intervention by the
USDA is extraordinarily rare.1 6 2 The footage was so shocking that
McDonald's, Costco, and In-N-Out Burger quickly cut ties with the sup-
plier.163
The animal-agriculture industry, not surprisingly, was outraged. The
industry pressured members of Congress to take action, and a few days
after the plant was shuttered, three U.S. Representatives from California
sent a letter to the USDA calling for the immediate reopening of the
slaughterhouse.' U.S. Representatives Devin Nunes, Kevin McCarthy,
and Jeff Denham said that its closure was hurting the economy and the
government needed "to intervene against the onslaught of attacks that are
occurring at the behest of radical groups."'65 In a blog post, Representative
Nunes compared the nonviolent undercover filming to arson and described
it as "economic terrorism."'66 As a result, the slaughterhouse reopened.6 7
The first use of an ag-gag law, much like the first use of the Animal
Enterprise Terrorism Act, was for clearly constitutionally protected activ-
ity.168 In Utah, a young woman named Amy Meyer saw a sick cow being
pushed by a bulldozer outside of Dale Smith Meatpacking Company.169
She did what any of us would do in the age of iPhones and YouTube: she
filmed it.1 70 She was standing on the public street.171 I found out about the
161. Feds Close Central Valley Slaughterhouse, NBCLOSANGELES.COM (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:40
AM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Feds-Close-Central-Valley-Slaughterhouse-Cen-
tral-California-Central-Valley-Meat-Company-166880466.html.
162. See Peter Eisler, Veterinarian to Detail Slaughterhouse Breaches, USA TODAY,
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-03-03-food-safety N.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2018).
1 63. Christine Hauser, Work at Slaughterhouse Is Halted After Graphic Undercover Videos,
N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/work-
at-slaughterhouse-is-halted-after-graphic-undercover-videos.
164. Letter from Representative Devin Nunes, Representative Kevin McCarthy & Representa-
tive Jeff Denham to the Honorable Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Agric. (Aug. 23, 2012)
(on file with Rep. Devin Nunes's office).
165. Id.
166. Nunes, supra note 160.
167. Update: Hanford Slaughterhouse Gets USDA Approval to Reopen Today, SENTINEL (Aug.
27, 2012), http://hanfordsentinel.com/update-hanford-slaughterhouse-gets-usda-approval-to-reopen-
today/articled80b0d72-f05a-1 1 el -942c-001 9bb2963f4.html.
168. See Natasha Lennard, First "Ag-Gag" Charges Brought ... and Then Dropped, SALON
(Apr. 30, 2013, 1:48 PM), https://www.sa-
lon.com/2013/04/30/firstag gagcharges brought and-then dropped.
169. Emiley Morgan, Charges Dropped Against Woman in Utah's First 'Ag-Gag' Case,
DESERET NEWS UTAH (Apr. 30, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/arti-
cle/8 6 5 57 9 2 23 /Charges-dropped-against-woman-in-Utahs-first-ag-gag-case.




case and broke the story on my website.17 Within twenty-four hours it had
created such an uproar that prosecutors dropped all 
charges. 173
The most significant impact of ag-gag laws is that they have brought
together a wide range of groups that typically do not engage in dialogue.1
7 4
It has helped build multi-issue coalitions that never existed before, includ-
ing Amnesty International, PETA, labor unions, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, the Sierra Club, Human Rights Watch, and many others.1
75
The message of these groups has been that if we allow this to take place,
if we allow factory farms to silence their critics, other whistleblowers will
be next.' 76
"What at first might appear to be exclusively an animal abuse issue
is, on closer inspection, clearly also a freedom of expression issue, a work-
ers' rights issue, an environmental issue[,] and a public health issue," Am-
nesty International said in a statement.177 "[S]unshine-in our case, the
proverbial candle-really is the best disinfectant. We have no hope of
stopping abuses if we can't even bring them to light."
78
This was the foundation of a constitutional challenge to Idaho's
ag-gag law. 179 The Animal Legal Defense Fund led the legal effort, argu-
ing that ag-gag is an unconstitutional attempt by the agriculture industry
to silence journalists, animal advocates, and whistleblowers who expose
cruel farming practices.'80 A wide range of organizations supported the
lawsuit by filing amicus briefs.'8 ' They represented food-safety, environ-
mental, labor, whistleblower, and journalism organizations.182
172. See Will Potter, First "Ag-Gag" Prosecution: Utah Woman Filmed a Slaughterhouse from
the Public Street, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.greenisthe-
newred.com/blog/first-ag-gag-arrest-utah-amy-meyer.
173. Jim Dalrymple II, Utah Prosecutor Dismisses Suddenly High-Profile "Ag-Gag" Case,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 1, 2013, 7:39 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/arti-
cle.php?id=56240592&itype=CMSID.
174. See Statement of Opposition to Proposed "Ag-Gag" Laws from Broad Spectrum of Interest
Groups, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/statement-opposition-pro-
posed-ag-gag-laws-broad-spectrum-interest (last visited June 9, 2018).
175. See id.; What Are "Ag-Gag" Bills?, PETA, https://www.peta.org/action/action-alerts/ag-
gag-bills (last visited June 9, 2018).
176. See Gabe Rottman, "Ag-Gag" Not Just About Animal Welfare, ACLU (May 3, 2013, 9:54
AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/ag-gag-not-just-about-animal-welfare.
177. Vienna Colucci, Amnesty Makes it 60, AMNESTY INT'L USA: HUM. RTS. Now BLOG (May
24, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/amnesty-makes-it-60.
178. Id.
179. Civil Rights Complaint at 1-2, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D.
Idaho 2015), aff'd in part & rev'din part sub nom. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184
(9th Cit. 2018) (No. 1:14-CV-104).
180. Id.
181. ALDF v. Otter, ACLU IDAHO, https://www.acluidaho.org/en/cases/aldf-v-otter (last visited
June 9, 2018) (providing access to the court documents filed in the case).
182. John Sowell, Free Speech Advocates Rush to Oppose Idaho's Ag-Gag Law in 9th Circuit




In a landmark decision against ag-gag, a U.S. district court ruled that
the law infringed upon First Amendment activity by criminalizing news-
gathering and distribution.'8 3 Video footage that is favorable to the indus-
try would not be subject to prosecution: it is only critical reporting that is
at risk. 184 The ag-gag law "gives agricultural facility owners veto power,
allowing owners to decide what can and cannot be recorded, effectively
turning them into state-backed censors able to silence unfavorable speech
about their facilities," Judge Lynn Winmill said in the ruling.18 1
Idaho's ag-gag law also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution "because it was motivated in substantial part by animus
towards animal welfare groups," Judge Winmill said."' "The overwhelm-
ing evidence gleaned from the legislative history indicates that § 18-7042
was intended to silence animal welfare activists, or other whistleblowers,
who seek to publish speech critical of the agricultural production indus-
try," Winmill wrote.187 "Many legislators made their intent crystal clear by
comparing animal rights activists to terrorists . . . ." 88
Nevertheless, ag-gag proposals continue to be introduced at the state
level in evolved forms.189 The most recent ag-gag law, which went into
effect in early 2016 in North Carolina, marked a sweeping expansion of
the scope of this legislation.190 The bill was introduced on the same day
that a fifth Butterball employee pled guilty to criminal cruelty to animals-
charges that would not be possible without the undercover investigations
that bills like this aim to criminalize.191 North Carolina's H.B. 405,192 the
Commerce Protection Act, does not "include any 'terrorism' language, as
others have in the past, and it [does not] mention animal agriculture at
all."1 9 3 Instead, it says: "It is unlawful for any person to willfully make
false statements or representations or to fail to disclose requested infor-
mation as part of an employment application" if the purpose is "to create
or produce a record that reproduces an image or sound occurring within
the employer's facility, including a photographic, video, or audio" or "to
capture or remove data, paper, records, or any other documents."'94 It goes
183. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
184. Id. at 1206.
185. Id. at 1207.
186. Id. at 1202.
187. Id. at 1210.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2017).
190. See id.
191. See Vandhana Bala, Breaking News: Yet Another Butterball Turkey Employee Convicted of
Cruelty to Animals, MERCY FOR ANIMALS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.mercyforanimals.org/breaking-
news-yet-another-butterball-turkey-employee-convicted-of-cruelty-to-animals.
192. H.B. 405, 2015 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2015).
193. Will Potter, Breaking: New Ag-Gag Bill Introduced in North Carolina on Same Day But-
terball Worker Pleads Guilty to Cruelty, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.greenis-
thenewred.com/blog/north-carolina-ag-gag-whistleblower-law/685 1.
194. S.B. 648 at § 14-105.1(a)(1)-(2).
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on to say that "[a]ny recording ... shall be turned over to local law en-
forcement within 24 hours."'95
As the New York Times noted in an editorial against the measure:
"The law originally singled out factory-farm exposes, but after it twice
failed to pass in the face of resistance from animal-rights activists, law-
makers succeeded in pushing through a version that covered everyone
equally."' 9 6
VI. RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE IGNORED
I have discussed at length what is being labeled as terrorism and how
alleged terrorists are being treated. But equally, if not more important, is
who is not being labeled as terrorists. Right-wing groups who have a his-
tory of bloodshed are repeatedly left out of FBI and Homeland Security
listings.'97 This includes anti-abortion extremists,'9 neo-Nazis,'
99 and
right-wing militias who have seized federal land with assault rifles.
20 0
Right-wing violence has increased by more than 400% since the
1990s, according to a study by West Point's Combating Terrorism Cen-
ter.20 ' That is an average of 140 injuries a year, and 30 deaths, primarily
caused by the targeting of people because of their race or sexual orienta-
tion.20 2 In the three years after September 11, alone, there were 283 injuries
and 71 deaths caused by these groups.2 03 When I studied every data set
available from the FBI for domestic terrorism incidents, though, I found
something even more disturbing. According to the bureau, every single act
of domestic terrorism in this period, except for one, was the work of animal
rights advocates and environmentalists with no history of bloodshed.
204
There are two possible explanations for this. One is that the FBI-the
lead agency responsible for investigating domestic terrorism-has abso-
lutely no idea that this right-wing violence is taking place. The second is
that law enforcement is intentionally ignoring or downplaying threats to
human lives to focus antiterrorism resources on political activists who
195. Id at§ 14-105.1(c).
196. The Editorial Board, Opinion, No More Exposs in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2016, at A20.
197. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM 2002-2005, at 1,
https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-
2 0 02 -
2 0 0 5 (last visited June 9, 2018).
198. See, e.g., NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, 2016 VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION STATISTICS: AN
ESCALATION IN HATE SPEECH, INTIMIDATION, AND OBSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS A DECREASE IN
EXTREME VIOLENCE 1 (2016).
199. See, e.g., Documenting Hate, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/hate-
crimes (last visited June 9, 2018).
200. See Les Zaitz, Militia Takes over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters,
OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (Jan. 2, 2016, 6:15 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/01/dramainbums_endswithquiet.html.
201. ARIE PERLIGER, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. AT W. POINT, CHALLENGERS FROM THE
SIDELINES: UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S VIOLENT FAR-RIGHT 87 (2012).
202. See id. at 100 fig.4, 106 fig.9.
203. Id. at 100 fig.4.
204. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 197.
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threaten corporate profits.205 In either case, this puts public safety in dan-
ger. When FBI agents are attempting to infiltrate vegan potlucks,20 6 they
are not investigating legitimate terrorism threats.
Time and again, this warning has come from top levels of govern-
ment. In 2003, the Justice Department warned the FBI that its obsessive
focus on animal rights and environmental activists-what the bureau
deems its "number one domestic terrorism threat"-was leaving danger-
ous threats unchecked.20 7 The FBI was urged to no longer "spend time and
resources on lower-threat activities by social protesters."208
In 2005, ten years after the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal
Building, the House Committee on Homeland Security released a report
urging the Department of Homeland Security to work more closely with
the FBI and address the growth of "right-wing domestic terrorist
,,209
groups. In 2012, another congressional report on domestic terrorism
echoed these concerns, saying: "[T]he crimes committed by animal rights
extremists and eco-terrorists cannot be compared to clearly violent at-
tacks."2 10
The FBI has ignored all of these warnings and maintained its focus. 2 11
For example, the very same week that a terrorist attack killed forty-nine
people at a gay nightclub in Florida in 2016, the FBI distributed a press
release about animal rights activists who freed animals from a fur farm.2 12
The activists had released mink into the wild and vandalized property by
painting "[1]iberation is [1]ove." 2 13
FBI training documents warn of a "[p]ublic [r]elations [w]ar" by an-
imal activists, yet say "[m]ilitia [e]xtremists"-who are now openly car-
rying assault rifles as security forces at neo-Nazi rallies-are less of a
threat because "[m]ovement burn[ed] out by late 1990s.",214 In 2010, the
205. See generally POTTER, supra note 14 (discussing in detail how these priorities were influ-
enced by corporate lobbying efforts).
206. Mark Frauenfelder, FBILookingfor Vegan Potluck Terrorists, BOINGBOING (May 21,2008,
10:08 AM), https://boingboing.net/2008/05/21/fbi-looking-for-vega.
207. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 04-10, THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE AND
OTHER INFORMATION 93-94 (2003).
208. Id. at 94.
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RIGHT-WING DOMESTIC TERRORISTS 2 (2005).
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FBI shockingly sent out an intelligence bulletin titled "White Supremacist
Extremist Violence Possibly Decreases."215 That has not happened.
2 16 In-
217
stead, right-wing violence has continued to climb. As the authors of the
West Point study ominously warned in 2012: "[E]lection years, as well as
an increase in the power of conservative political forces, are normally ac-
companied by increased levels of far right violence."
2 18
VII. TRUMP'S ENVIRONMENT
With the rise of Donald Trump, right-wing violence has spiked dra-
matically.219 Neo-Nazis, armed militias, and avowedly fascist groups have
been inspired and emboldened.2 2 0 Trump has built a political platform on
anti-immigrant and antirefugee rhetoric.22 His former chief strategist,
Steve Bannon, is a white supremacist.
222 His former deputy assistant, Se-
bastian Gorka, proudly wears a medal associated with Hungary's Nazi col-
laborators.2 23 Trump has called for border walls and crackdowns on sanc-
224
tuary cities. Immediately after the recent terrorist attack on a pop concert
in London, he said it was more evidence of why the United States needed
a Muslim ban.225
215. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMIST VIOLENCE
POSSIBLY DECREASES BUT RACIST SKINHEADS REMAIN THE MOST VIOLENT 1 (2010).
216. See Arie Perliger, Homegrown Terrorism and Why the Threat of Right-Wing Extremism Is
Rising in America, NEWSWEEK (June 4, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/homegrown-
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217. Id.
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7(2017).
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Donald Trump's New Campaign Chief Created an Online Haven for White Nationalists, MOTHER
JONES (Aug. 22, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/stephen-bannon-
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223. Alexander Smith & Vladimir Banic, Sebastian Gorka Made Nazi-Linked Vitezi Rend
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migration Policy, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-
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Fascist groups like Identity Evropa, the Proud Boys, Lion Guard, and
others have mobilized to take advantage of this political environment.22 6
They have published lists of businesses "openly hostile to . . . Trump."2 2 7
They have held rallies with torches.228 In May 2017, a white supremacist
and alt-right supporter named Jeremy Christian yelled racist comments at
229Muslim women on a train in Portland, Oregon. When three men inter-
vened to stop him, he killed two of them and slit the other's throat.2 30 In
the courtroom on May 30, Christian yelled, "Free speech or die, Port-
land," 231 and "You call it terrorism, I call it patriotism."23 2 In August 2017,
so-called alt-right groups marched in Charlottesville, Virginia, alongside
233neo-Nazis and armed militias2. On that day a black protester, Deandre
Harris, was beaten by white supremacists with metal poles.23 4 In a separate
incident that day, a twenty-year-old white nationalist drove his car into the
crowd of counter-protesters, murdering thirty-two year old Heather Heyer
and injuring nineteen others.235 There have been at least two other inci-
dents of right-wing extremists driving cars into crowds of protesters, in
226. See infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
227. See Trevor Baratko, More: Leesburg Woman, Business Owner Receives Startling
'Anti-election' Email, LONDON TIMES-MIRROR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.loudoun-
times.com/news/article/leesburgwoman andbusiness-owner-receives tartlinganti_elec-
tion email432.
228. See Madison Park, Charlottesville Mayor Slams 'Despicable Visit' as Another Torch Rally
Held, CNN (Oct. 8, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/us/charlottesville-torch-
rally/index.html.
229. Doug Brown, Suspect in Portland Hate Crime Murders Is a Known White Supremacist,
PORTLAND MERCURY (May 27, 2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.portlandmercury.com/blog-
town/2017/05/27/190415 9 4/suspect-in-portland-hate-crime-murders-is-a-known-white-supremacist.
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NEWS (May 31, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/portland-train-stabbing-suspect-
thats-what-liberalism-gets-you-docs.
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Court Appearance, NBC News (May 30, 2017 (8:11 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/portland-stabbing-suspect-yells-free-speech-or-die-first-court-n766416.
232. Associated Press, Portland Stabbing Suspect: "You Call It Terrorism, I Call It Patriotism!,"
POLITICO (May 30, 2017, 7:34 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/30/portland-attacks-
muslims-bias-238955.
233. See Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline.
234. Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, Charlottesville: Black Protester Deandre Harris 'Beaten
with Metal Poles'by White Supremacists, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2017, 3:48 PM), http://www.inde-
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California236 and Missouri.237 In Nebraska, a heavily armed white suprem-
acist-carrying his National Socialist Movement membership card-man-
aged to stop an Amtrak train.238 He said he was interested in "killing black
people."239
Rather than direct law enforcement to address this crisis, or even is-
sue a strong public condemnation from the White House, President Trump
has rolled back some of the few, modest initiatives targeting right-wing
violence. He has overhauled the Countering Violent Extremism program
to focus solely on Islam and exclude right-wing terrorism.
240 Funding
through the Department of Homeland Security for a program to fight white
supremacists was revoked.241 Neo-Nazis like Andrew Anglin of the Daily
Stormer have celebrated and proclaimed "Trump is setting us free."
242
Trump has clearly inspired the far right, but the FBI has known for
decades that these groups pose a growing threat.243 Neo-Nazis marching
through the streets of America, advocating violence while carrying fire-
arms, and driving into crowds of peaceful protesters-nightmarish scenes
like this did not emerge overnight.244 Now, as these extremist groups in-
creasingly deliver on their promises for bloodshed, the FBI is dodging re-
24
sponsibility. An FBI official told Politico that the bureau is constrained
246
by legal protections that make it difficult to target white nationalists.
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INDEPENDENT (Oct. 27, 2017, 7:21 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-pol-
itics/trump-protest-man-drives-car-protesters-califomia-brea-a80
2 3 716.html.
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Foreign Policy reported receiving a recent FBI intelligence bulletin that
warned of right-wing violence and said FBI warnings went unheeded.247
This could not be further from the truth. The FBI has not been sound-
ing the alarm about white-supremacist violence; it has been silencing it. 24 8
The problem has never been a lack of resources or investigatory power;
the problem is a lack of political will. The top domestic terrorism agency
in the United States has repeatedly minimized the threat of right-wing vi-
olence while defending its focus on nonviolent protesters and, among
them, animal rights and environmental activists.249
However, the trends I have documented are not just a danger to public
safety. If left unchecked, they are a threat to democracy itself.
VIII. ALARMING AND UNDEMOCRATIC TREND
For the first time in twenty-seven years, Human Rights Watch has
listed the United States as a global threat to human rights, citing the rise
of Donald Trump and warning that his presidency could "cause tremen-
dous harm to vulnerable communities, contravene the United States' core
human rights obligations, or both." 2 50 For the first time in its history, the
Economist Intelligence Unit, which is the sister company of the Economist
newspaper, has listed the United States as a "flawed democracy" (rather
than a "full democracy") in its annual Democracy Index. 251 Through it all,
252Trump has been the master of obfuscation. Anything critical is "fake
news."253 His supporters are not white supremacists, they are the
,,254"alt-right. Journalists who challenge him are "the enemy of the Amer-
ican people."255 He officially declared his inauguration day the "National
Day of Patriotic Devotion."
247. Jana Winter, FBI and DHS Warned of Growing Threat from White Supremacists Months
Ago, FP (Aug. 14, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/14/fbi-and-dhs-warned-of-
growing-threat-from-white-supremacists-months-ago.
248. See Watkins & Meyer, supra note 245.
249. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
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TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/human-rights-watch-
trump.html.
251. The Data Team, Declining Trust in Government Is Denting Democracy, ECONOMIST (Jan.
25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/01/daily-chart-20.
252. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
253. See Meg Kelly, President Trump Cries "Fake News" and the World Follows, WASH. POST
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/06/president-trump-
cries-fake-news-and-the-world-follows.
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premacy (last visited June 9, 2018).
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People," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2017, at Al5.
256. Abby Phillip, Trump Names His Inauguration Day a "National Day ofPatriotic Devotion,"
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-poli-
tics/wp/2017 /01/ 2 3/trump-names-his-inauguration-day-a-national-day-of-patriotic-devotion.
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In the first year of the Trump Administration, there has already been
a resurgence, and expansion, of many tactics used to criminalize animal
rights and environmental activists. 257 The Trump-affiliated Breitbart News
labeled Earth First! a "terror-affiliated group" and warns, "[T]he Earth
First! Journal is very media-savvy.'258 A top executive of Energy Transfer
Partners, the company building the Dakota Access Pipeline, said pipeline
opponents are terrorists.259 Greenpeace is being sued by Resolute Forest
Products, one of the largest logging and paper companies; the company
argues that Greenpeace and the environmental movement were part of a
mob-like conspiracy under RICO.260
In at least eighteen states, Republican lawmakers have introduced
bills to restrict the right to protest,261 prompting the United Nations to warn
that the United States is witnessing an "alarming and undemocratic trend"
262
that chills dissent2. In Minnesota, a proposal was introduced to allow cit-
ies to sue protesters for the cost of policing their protests.
263 In Iowa, a bill
was introduced to make blocking the road with a march or protest a fel-
ony.264 In at least six states, Republican lawmakers have introduced pro-265
posals to protect drivers who run over protesters with their car.
Jennifer Cook, policy director of the American Civil Liberties Union
of North Dakota, said there was a "concentrated effort to criminalize pro-
257. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
258. Lee Stranahan, Terror-Affiliated Group Is Part of Coalition to Stop Trump Inauguration,
BREITBART.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/01/19/terror-affili-
ated-group-is-part-of-coalition-to-stop-trump-inauguration.
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clel32908744.html.
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INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
0 4 102017/greenpeace-rico-
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Least 18 States, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washing-
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tests" in her state after the protest led by Native American tribes at Stand-
ing Rock.266 In Colorado, a bill targeted environmentalists who tamper
with oil and gas equipment in acts of civil disobedience; under the pro-
posal, antipipeline protesters would face felony charges and up to eighteen
months in prison.26 7 At the federal level, more than eighty members of
Congress signed a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions urging the Jus-
tice Department to investigate environmentalists as domestic terrorists.268
Perhaps the best illustration of how these repressive measures have
expanded comes from Washington state.269 The deputy director of the
Trump campaign there has promised to introduce new legislation that
would punish protest as a felony if it causes "economic disruption" and
hurts corporate profits.270 State Senator Doug Ericksen, the author of the
bill, says "protests that block highways or roads-such as recent Black
Lives Matter protests, or the indigenous movement at Standing Rock
against the Dakota Access Pipeline-are 'economic terrorism."' 271 But
272protesters are not the only targets. In a statement on his website, Erick-
sen says that the bill will also criminalize those who "fund, organize, spon-
sor or otherwise encourage others to commit acts of economic terror-
*,,273ism.
This is the exact language and legislation that has been used for dec-
ades to target animal rights and environmental activists. Similar proposals
in the same state, such as S.B. 6566, targeted "terrorist acts against animal
and natural resource facilities."274 Ericksen acknowledges that the "Pre-
266. Mitch Smith & Michael Wines, Across the Country, a Republican Push to Rein in Protest-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2017, at Al l.
267. S.B. 17-035, 71st Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) (2017) (stating that the minimum sentence for a class-six felony in Colorado
is eighteen months).
268. See Press Release, Kristi Noem, Representative from S.D., Noem Urges Justice Department
to Evaluate Pipeline Security in Lieu of Recent Threats (Oct. 23, 2017) (on file with Rep. Kristi
Noem's office).
269. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
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venting Economic Terrorism Act" is not limited to animal rights and en-
vironmental activists, as originally intended.275 After the presidential elec-
tion and in the wake of mass national protests against President Trump, he
276
decided to drop those limitations entirely.
IX. SLOW RECOVERY
John Scott Haldane, the nineteenth-century physiologist, radically re-
shaped our understanding of how to survive dangerous environments.
27 7
His groundbreaking work continues to shape environmental and medi-
cal-health sciences today.278 It was not until 1986-ninety years after he
recommended monitoring canaries in coal mines-that an alternative
method was developed.2 79
In all of Haldane's many investigations and recommendations,
though, there was rarely, if ever, a fast or easy solution.
280 Many of his
answers were counterintuitive.281 In his studies of deep sea divers and de-
compression sickness, for example, Haldane learned that divers cannot
quickly ascend.28 2 They must move slowly and stop at incremental depths
along the way.283 In one of his mining studies, Haldane brought his son,
Jack, into a deep underground mine filled with gas.
284 He told him to recite
Mark Antony's speech from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, to gauge how
long he could speak before passing out.2 8 5 Soon after "friends, Romans,
countrymen," his son began to pant, his legs buckled, and he collapsed.
2 86
Methane gas is lighter than air, Haldane learned.287 If workers attempt to
escape a mine by running, they will be breathing in methane and poison
themselves.288 Instead, he warned, they must crawl slowly on the ground
289
to safety.
275. Potter, supra note 271; see also Essex Porter, Protest Bill Creates Crime of "Economic
Terrorism," KIRO 7 (Nov. 18, 2016, 9:41 AM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/washington-state-
senator-seeks-to-criminalize-illegal-protests/
4 6 7 9 62 158 ("Senator Ericksen has oil refineries in his
district and says he's really trying to go after people who try to block oil trains.").
276. Potter, supra note 271; see Brooke Seipel, Washington Republican Proposes Charging Pro-
testers with "Economic Terrorism," HILL (Nov. 17, 2016, 12:46 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/306580-washington-republican-floats-charging-protesters-with-economic-terrorism.
277. See Sekhar & Rao, supra note 1.
278. See id.
279. Kat Eschner, The Story ofthe Real Canary in the Coal Mine, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Dec. 30,
2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/story-real-canary-coal-mine.
280. See, e.g., A.E. Boycott et al., The Prevention of Compressed-Air Illness, 8 J. HYGIENE 342,
358-61 (1908).
281. See, e.g., id
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE









This is becoming a toxic political environment for dissent in the
United States,290 and it is just the beginning of the Trump Administration.
But we have to remember that this political climate-the composition of
the air in our mine-can only partially be attributed to President Trump.
The rhetoric of terrorism has been institutionalized,2 9 1 dangerous legal
precedents have been established,292 and legislative proposals to criminal-
ize protest have been codified.29 3 These dangerous conditions have been
growing over decades, across both Democratic and Republican Admin-
istrations, including President Barack Obama's.
Now, this political climate has been inherited by an authoritarian, and
new enemies are being identified.294 The FBI and Homeland Security have
issued confidential intelligence briefings about anarchists and antifascists,
or "antifa," that mirror similar warnings about "eco-terrorism."295 More
than 200 people, including journalists, were arrested at protests of Trump's
inauguration.2 96 They faced felony riot charges, decades in prison, and a
media smear campaign describing them as "anarchists" and domestic ter-
297rorists. Mark Goldstone, who represented six of the "J20" defendants,
said the charges were "unprecedented territory." 298 "In my over thirty
years of practicing law," he said, "I've never seen anything like this."2 9 9
Hundreds of thousands of people have signed a White House petition that
urged Trump to label antifa as terrorists.300 "[J]ust as [the United States]
rightfully declared ISIS a terror group," the petition says, "they must de-
clare AntiFa a terror group."3or When a train crashed in Washington,
290. See supra Part VII.
291. See supra Part 1.
292. See supra Part IV.
293. See supra Parts IV, V.
294. See, e.g., Josh Meyer, FBI, Homeland Security Warn of More "Antifa" Attacks, POLITICO
(Sept. 1, 2017, 4:55 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/01/antifa-charlottesville-violence-
fbi-242235.
295. Id.
296. Adam K. Raymond, J20 Defendants Cleared of Charges in Trump Inauguration Arrests,
N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:41 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelli-
gencer/2017/12 /defendants-cleared-of-charges-in-inauguration-day-arrests.html; Sean Rossman, Free
Speech or Destruction: First Trump Inauguration Protesters Go on Trial, USA TODAY (Nov. 20,
2017, 5:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/11/20/free-speech-destruc-
tion-first-trump-inauguration-protesters-go-trial/882512001.
297. Elizabeth King, Inside the J20 Prosecution: How the Feds Are Criminalizing Dissent, PAC.
STANDARD (Dec. 12, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/j20-defendants-and-the-crackdown-on-
protest.
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Trump's political strategist Roger Stone falsely 302 told journalists that an-
tifascists and anarchists were the "prime suspect" and "have blood on their
hands now, very clearly."
303
The tactics that have been pioneered against animal rights and envi-
ronmental activists are not just expanding domestically, they are being ex-
ported internationally.3 04 In 2011, for example, at about the same time
modem ag-gag laws emerged in the United States, undercover investiga-
tions of animal abuse started being classified as "terrorism" throughout
Europe.30 5 Europol, the European police agency, published a report on ter-
rorism threats meant as a warning for law enforcement agencies.306 The
report included the 2005 bombing of the London subway, for example,
and the 2004 bombing of the Madrid train system.
3 07 The report also in-
cluded a section on animal rights activists and a warning about activists
with cameras.308 "ARE [animal rights extremists] activists also use disin-
formation methods in order to discredit their targets and weaken their pub-
lic acceptance," the report says.309 "Images of sick and abused animals are
embedded in video footage and made public." 31 0 In Austria, Spain, Nor-
way, and many other countries, ambitious prosecutions of animal rights
and environmental activists as "terrorists" have been directly modeled on
U.S. case law. In Australia, corporations have copied this playbook verba-
tim. Katrina Hodgkinson, the former New South Wales Primary Industries
Minister, said animal advocates who film farms without permission are
"akin to terrorists."3 1 1 "Farmers [even offered a] $10,000 (AUS) reward to
anyone who can help convict an animal activist."
3 12 The pig industry has
paid for television ads that say animal activists with cameras "terrorist pigs
302. See Michael Edison Hayden, "Antifa" Falsely Linked to Amtrak Train Derailment by
Right-Wing Conspiracy Peddlers, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2017, 6:14 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/antifa-falsely-linked-amtrak-train-derailment-right-wing-conspiracy-
peddlers-751893 (stating that the link between "Antifa" and the Amtrack train derailment is false).
303. Andrew Blake, Washington Train Crash Linked to Antifa by Conspiracy Theorists, Trump




304. See, e.g., EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2011: EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 31-32
(2011).
305. See id.
306. See id. at 4.
307. Id. at 13.
308. Id. at 32.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Animal Rights Activists "Akin to Terrorists," Says NSW Minister Katrina Hodgkinson,






312. Will Potter, Attack on Factory Farm Whistleblowers Goes Global (Feb. 16, 2014),
https://www.thedodo.com/attack-on-factory-fann-whistle-432282967.html; Simon Thomsen, Aus-
tralian Farmers Have a $10,000 Bounty out on Animal Rights Activists over Farm Raids, BUS. INSIDER




at night."313 The agriculture industry in Australia is openly, explicitly mod-
eling Australian proposals after U.S. legislation.3 14 In my research, I found
that portions of it were directly copied and pasted verbatim from U.S. leg-
islation.
Unlike John Scott Haldane, I can make no assertions about the point
at which the air in our political environment is no longer breathable. First
Amendment law, civil liberties, and social movements are all decidedly
unscientific areas of study. But I do know that people around the world are
watching the U.S. democracy as a sentinel species. In my research, I have
repeatedly been told by lawyers, protesters, civil liberties groups, and law-
makers around the world that they are studying us-not just animal rights
and environmental activists but the broader political environment in the
United States-as a warning of what is to come.
313. John Stewart, Animal Rights Battle, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:56 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-05/animal-rights-battle/5072026.
314. See VOICELESS LTD. & BARRISTERS ANIMAL WELFARE PANEL LTD., JOINT SUBMISSION
ON THE ALRC's REVIEW ON "SERIOUS INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA," 15-16 (2013).
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In 1996, to address the persistent problem of delays in the processing
of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, Congress passed the
Electronic Freedom of Information Act (EFOIA), which included a suite
of reforms. Chief among them was the affirmative disclosure mandate: a
requirement hat agencies proactively post frequently requested records on
their websites. These affirmative disclosures were intended to increase
public access to government records and to free up agency resources spent
reactively responding to FOIA requests by making such requests "an ave-
nue of last resort."
However, more than two decades since the affirmative disclosure
mandate was enacted, delays in processing FOIA requests remain exces-
sive, compliance with it is spotty at best, and attempts to enforce it have
met with procedural hurdles. In an effort to make good on the decades-old
promise of EFOIA's affirmative disclosure mandate, this Article tackles
those procedural hurdles and urges courts reconsider how they handle
challenges to agencies' noncompliance with the mandate. This Article ar-
gues that the judicial decisions regarding the relief available for violations
of the affirmative disclosure mandate have overlooked critical issues and
have rendered Congress's mandate largely unenforceable. It concludes
with a call to revisit these decisions and to allow relief in the form of com-
pelling precisely what Congress intended-the posting online of fre-
quently requested records. Only by doing so might we finally make good
on EFOIA's promise.
"The history of the Freedom of Information Act ... is a chronicle of
the perils and problems of translating rhetoric into performance .... 
"By the time freedom of information requests are fulfilled, the infor-
mation is often useless to the requester, if the requester has not died of
old age."2
f Vice President and Deputy General Counsel for Captive Animal Law Enforcement at the
PETA Foundation, and Adjunct Faculty at Vermont Law School.
I. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 649 (1984).
2. 142 CONG. REC. 23,439 (1996) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
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"It takes constant vigilance, commitment, and common sense to make
any law work. I hope we as citizens have all these qualities-in large
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INTRODUCTION
As Professor David Vladeck has noted, "[T]here is now a significant
and growing dissonance between the promises made by our federal
right-to-know laws and their performance." This Article seeks to address
one piece of that dissonance: the dissonance between the promise of the
affirmative disclosure mandates that were central to the 1996 EFOIA
amendments and the reality of rampant disregard of those mandates.
3. Wald, supra note 1, at 683.
4. David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape ofFederal
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1792 (2008).
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FULFILLING THE PROMTSE
In 1996, in an effort to meaningfully address the backlogs and serious
delays that plagued implementation of FOIA, Congress enacted a suite of
reforms.5 One key reform was to require that agencies proactively post
online all records that had been released in response to a request and "that
because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency determine[d] have
become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for sub-
stantially the same records."6 This affirmative disclosure mandate was in-
tended to benefit agencies-by reducing the number of requests re-
ceived-as well as the public-by making records available without hav-
ing to submit a request.7 Compliance with the mandate, however, has been
spotty at best,8 and attempts to enforce it have met with procedural hurdles.
In an effort to make good on the decades-old promise of EFOIA's affirm-
ative disclosure mandate, this Article addresses those procedural hurdles
and proposes changes to the way that the courts address challenges to
agencies' noncompliance with the mandate.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
FOIA and the EFOIA amendments, including the failed promise of those
amendments. Part II presents a case study to illustrate and interrogate that
failed promise. It examines the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA)
compliance-and noncompliance-with the affirmative disclosure man-
date in the context of its implementation of the federal Animal Welfare
Act (AWA). Part III then analyzes the decisions resolving alleged viola-
tions of the affirmative disclosure mandate. Part IV concludes that the
courts have erred in their approach and, as a result, have rendered Con-
gress's mandate largely unenforceable. It then proposes recommendations
for remedying these errors to finally make good on EFOIA's affirmative
disclosure promise.
I. FOIA AND EFOIA AMENDMENTS
A. FOIA
At its most basic, FOIA creates a statutory right to government rec-
ords.9 As former Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit Patricia M. Wald has explained:
The FOIA's concept is simple but revolutionary.. . .Any person,
citizen or non-citizen-for whatever reason, good or ill-may file a
request for an agency record, and the agency must disclose it unless
the document falls within one of nine exemptions laid down in the law.
5. See President's Statement on Signing the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments of 1996, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1743 (Oct. 2, 1996) [hereinafter President's Statement].
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)(ii)(I) (2012).
7. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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If the agency refuses, the citizen can go to court on a priority basis,
and the agency has to convince the court that the documents are ex-
empt under the law. Most important, the court decides the issue afresh,
without deference to the agency's call.'
0
Thus, FOIA's core original mechanism was a reactive one-in re-
sponse to a request, the government would provide records." Even today,
FOIA is most known for this ability to obtain records by submitting a re-
quest.
But that is not, and has never been, FOIA's only mechanism. Even
from the beginning, FOIA included a proactive provision as well. As Pro-
fessor Michael Herz has described:
From the outset, FOIA required that certain items be either pub-
lished in the Federal Register or "made available for public inspection
and copying." Items in the first category, now known as "(a)(1) mate-
rial," after the relevant section of the amended statute, include descrip-
tions of agency organization, rules of procedure, and proposed and fi-
nal regulations. The second category, "(a)(2) material," originally con-
sisted of final opinions and orders in agency adjudications, statements
of policy and interpretive rules that were not published in the Federal
Register, and administrative staff manuals. Hard copies of these were
to be maintained in "reading rooms" (a term that does not appear in
the statute) open to the public.12
Hence, in addition to requiring agencies to provide records on re-
quest, FOIA has always imposed some proactive responsibilities on agen-
cies as well.1 3 However, as Professor Herz notes, these original provisions
"do not require affirmative disclosure of government information. Rather,
they provide for disclosure of law."'
4 Because of their focus on the disclo-
sure of law, these provisions were enforced not through direct judicial re-
view for failure to disclose, but rather through a prohibition on relying on
law that had not properly been disclosed.' 5
10. Wald, supra note 1, at 655-56 (footnote omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (stating the
exemptions). These exemptions are to be "narrowly construed." Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 361 (1976). It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the exemptions in detail.
11. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 250, 250-51 (1966)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)) ("Except with respect to the records made available pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b), every agency shall, upon request for identifiable records made in accordance
with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute and procedure to
be followed, make such records promptly available to any person.").
12. Michael Herz, Law Lags Behind. FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7
CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 577, 586 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1)-(2) (2006); see also An Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378, 383
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2) (2012)).
13. Herz, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. See Freedom of Information Act § 3(b) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)).
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This mechanism stood in stark contrast to the broad public enforce-
ment available for a failure to respond to a request, i.e., for noncompliance
with FOIA's reactive provision.6 There, FOIA provided:
Upon complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in
which tile complainant resides, or has his principal place of business,
or in which the agency records are situated shall have jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from the withholding of agency records and to order
the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
complainant. 17
Consistent with the legislative history, which rejected the notion that
a requestor would have to establish their particular interest in requested
records, courts have recognized that this provision "means that any person
who submits a request may obtain access to governmental records regard-
less of whether they have a personal stake in the information sought."18
FOIA also provided for expedited treatment of FOIA lawsuits, establish-
ing that they should take precedence on the docket and should be "expe-
dited in every way."' 9 In addition, failure to comply with a court order to
produce records was punishable as contempt.20
Despite the promise of FOIA, as Professor Mark Grunewald has
noted, "From the outset, delay in processing requests was the source of
widespread complaint .... 21 Indeed, just five years after the law was
enacted, a House Committee report found that "[t]he efficient operation of
the Freedom of Information Act has been hindered by [five] years of foot
dragging by the Federal bureaucracy."22
Congress sought to address these delays and other concerns through
amendments in 1974.23 Among other things, the 1974 amendments im-
posed statutory response times and required annual reporting to Congress
on compliance.24 The deadlines proved largely meaningless in practice,
25however. As Judge Wald has written:
16. See id § 3(c) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
17. Id.
18. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237 (3d Cir. 1993); accordPub. Emps. for Envtl.
Responsibility v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F. Supp. 2d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2013).
19. Freedom of Information Act § 3(c) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
20. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(G)).
21. Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the "Mother ofAll Complaints": Information Delivery
and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 345, 345 n.3 (1998) (citing U.S. Government Information
Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations H.R., 92d Cong. 37, 40 (1972)).
22. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 8-9 (1972).
23. Jefferey M. Sellers, Note, Public Enforcement ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act, 2 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 78, 105 (1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, at 8-9.
24. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1561-64 (1974) (codified
as amended at U.S.C. § 552(a)) (amending the Freedom of Information Act); Sellers, supra note 23,
at 81-82, 87, 100-07; see Wald, supra note 1, at 659-64 (discussing the effects of the 1974 amend-
ments).
25. See Wald, supra note 1, at 660.
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After 1974, the number of FOLA requests and the amount of litigation
challenging agency denials increased dramatically. . . . As a result,
courts excused the overwhelmed agencies from strict adherence to the
statutory ten-day deadline for responses. In fact, requesters often had
26
to wait months, even years on a first come, first served basis.
Thus, despite these and subsequent amendments to FOIA, delays
continued to plague the law.
27
B. The EFOIA Amendments and the Affirmative Disclosure Mandate
On October 2, 1996 (thirty years after FOIA was first enacted), Pres-
ident Bill Clinton signed into law the EFOIA Amendments, proclaiming
that they would "bring[] FOIA into the information and electronic age"
and "broaden[] public access to government information."
2 8 Similarly, at
a House hearing on the bill, one participant stated:
[T]he Electronic Freedom of Information Act will bring the Freedom
of Information Act from the technological stone age into the infor-
mation age....
Most importantly, the bill would tackle the mother of all com-
plaints lodged against the Freedom of Information Act: that is, the of-
ten ludicrous amount of time it take[s] some agencies to respond, if
they respond at all, to freedom of information requests.
By the time freedom of information requests are fulfilled, the in-
formation is often useless to the requester, if the requester has not died
of old age.29
Senator Patrick Leahy, a cosponsor of the amendments, similarly
noted:
Long delays in access can mean no access at all. The current time
limits in the FOIA are a joke. Few agencies actually respond to FOIA
requests within the 10-day limit required by law. Such routine failure
to comply with the statutory time limits is bad for morale in the agen-
cies and breeds contempt by citizens who expect government officials
to abide by, not routinely break, the law.
30
26. Id. (citing Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 614-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)).
27. See id.
28. President's Statement, supra note 5.
29. 142 CONG. REC. 23,438-39 (1996).
30. H.R. REP.No. 104-795, at 16 (1996).
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Indeed, the Senate Report notes that "agency delays in responding to
FOIA requests" were "the single most frequent complaint about the oper-
ation of the FOIA."
Although the EFOIA amendments included a panoply of mecha-
nisms, chief among them-and the focus of this Article-was the affirm-
ative disclosure mandate for frequently requested records.3 2 Whereas "for
its first thirty years, FOIA imposed no meaningful obligation of affirma-
tive disclosure of government information"33 other than law, the 1996
EFOIA amendments aimed to change this.3 4 Thus, with these amendments
it became mandatory for agencies to proactively post certain records on
their websites.3 5 Specifically, agencies are responsible for posting records
that have been provided in response to a standard, reactive FOIA request
and that "because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency deter-
mines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent re-
quests for substantially the same records."36
Agencies were also required to post "a general index of the records"
that were subject to the affirmative disclosure mandate.3 7
Enforcement of the affirmative disclosure mandate was made availa-
ble through the general judicial review provision of FOIA.3 8 The Senate
Report explained the affirmative disclosure mandate as follows:
The purpose of this provision in the bill is to prompt agencies to
make information available affirmatively on their own initiative in or-
der to meet anticipated public demand for it. In other words, FOIA
31. S. REP. No. 104-272, at 15 (1996).
32. See Grunewald, supra note 21, at 365-66.
33. Herz, supra note 12, at 587.
34. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
35. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110
Stat. 3048, 3048-49, 3053 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2012)) (describing
how the amendments required availability by "computer telecommunications," which has been under-
stood to mean the Internet); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROACTIVE DISCLOSURE OF NON-EXEMPT AGENCY
INFORMATION: MAKING INFORMATION AVAILABLE WITHOUT THE NEED TO FILE A FOIA REQUEST
(2017) (first citing S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 11 (1996); then citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 20-21
(1996)), https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-guidance/proactive-disclosure-of non-exemptinformation
(noting that EFOIA Amendments would require (a)(2) materials to be made available online); 142
CONG. REC. 23,789 (1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that the bill would encourage agencies
to increase online access to government records); 142 CONG. REC. 23,439 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Maloney) ("[The bill] would encourage agencies to offer online access to Government information,
effectively transforming an individual's home computer into a Government agency's public reading
room.").
36. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 § 4 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(d)(ii)(1)). More recently, under the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Congress
enacted what is known as the Beetlejuice rule, requiring that agencies also proactively post records
"that have been requested 3 or more times." See FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185,
§ 2, 130 Stat. 538, 538 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D)(ii)(II)). These records must also be refer-
enced in a publicly available index. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E).
38. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 846 F.3d 1235, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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processes should not be [e]ncumbered by requests for routinely avail-
able records or information that can more efficiently be made available
to the public through affirmative dissemination means.39
President Clinton in his signing statement likewise stressed: "As the
Government actively disseminates more information, I hope that there will
be less need to use FOIA to obtain government information."40
More specifically, the aim was to "reduce the number of duplicative
FOIA requests for the same records requiring separate agency re-
sponses."41 The House and Senate reports also specifically noted the im-
42
portance of the index requirement. For example, the House Report stated:
"[T]he general index would help requestors in determining which records
have been the subject of prior FOIA requests. By diverting some potential
FOIA requests for previously-released records with this index, agencies
can better use their FOIA resources to fulfill new requests."
43 The Senate
Report also noted that agencies themselves would benefit from the index
requirement because the index could help them "more readily identifty]"
records that had previously been requested "without the need for new
searches," thereby facilitating compliance with FOIA's time limits and
44
also "reduc[ing] costs to agencies in preparing responses.
As Professor Grunewald noted not long after the amendments were
enacted: "Perhaps the greatest delay-reducing potential of the Amend-
ments lies not in any of the provisions that seek to address delay directly,
but rather in those that seek to speed access by moving from a retail to a
wholesale approach to information delivery."
45 He continued:
By giving publication and reading rooms,. including electronic ver-
sions, a more central role, the Amendments will at least offer the pro-
spect of increased information delivery to the public with greater effi-
ciency. This opportunity is only enhanced by the fact that most
newly-created agency records and many records created in the past
decade were created, if not stored, in electronic form. The base thus
exists for an information access system that can be both highly auto-
mated and broadly available.
46
Professor Margaret Kwoka has detailed many of the sound policy
reasons for mandating affirmative disclosures:
39. S. REP. No. 104-272, at 13 (1996); see also Herz, supra note 12, at 588 ("As one observer
has written, the basic thrust of EFOIA was to shift from a system in which requesters endure lengthy
delays while waiting for paper copies of records 'to a model in which agencies anticipate requests and
act to make records (and information on how to find additional records) available over online sys-
tems."').
40. President's Statement, supra note 5.
41. S. REP. No. 104-272, at 13.
42. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
43. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 21 (1996).
44. S. REP. No. 104-272, at 13.
45. Grunewald, supra note 21, at 365.
46. Id. at 367.
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As a preliminary matter, it is likely to save agencies money. In fact,
almost nothing they could do could possibly be as expensive as re-
sponding to FOIA requests on a one-off basis when companies are
submitting them by the thousands. Some past empirical evidence sug-
gests that affirmative disclosure in other contexts saves agencies time
and money. Given that hundreds of requests are submitted for very
similar records each year, at the very least the money saved by dimin-
ished FOIA processing costs should free up resources for affirmative
disclosure. ...
Cost savings to the agency and freeing up FOIA processing re-
sources is not just a benefit to the public fisc. It also creates the room
for FOIA processing to better serve the public interests for which it
was intended. If the news media's primary complaint about FOIA is
the long wait to receive a response, more resources dedicated to the
requests that do fall within FOIA's primary intended use will surely
ameliorate that burden.47
C. Agency Disregard of the Affirmative Disclosure Mandate
Unfortunately, the promise of EFOIA remains unrealized. As the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has recognized, "When
enacting the EFOIA, Congress identified as one of the purposes of the Act
to 'ensure agency compliance with statutory time limits . . . .' Neither the
FOIA, nor its amendments in the EFOIA, has managed to accomplish this
goal."48 Professor Michael Herz has likewise noted that "EFOIA has not
wholly lived up to its promise. Although practices vary, not surprisingly,
from agency to agency, in general agencies have placed only a fraction of
the material that should be available in their reading rooms."49
According to Professor Kwoka:
The success of the E-FOIA provisions . . . has been generally
regarded as extremely limited because of agencies' implementation
failures. Even those agencies that have regularly posted frequently re-
quested records online-or even all records released under FOIA-
have generally done so in ways that remain hard for the public to
search for and locate records they might want. Accordingly, the public
47. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DuKE L.J. 1361, 1432 (2016). Professor Kwoka goes
on to note additional benefits as well. See id. at 1432-33 ("[Alffirmative disclosure of highly targeted
information would remove the profit potential of mere information reselling, keep the public function
of government transparency public, and allow for equal access to the records at issue. .. . In short, it
ensures that public resources remain public, rather than becoming the product to be sold for private
gain. Moreover, affirmative disclosure may benefit the private market as well. For instance, small
businesses or market entrants may not have the resources or the savvy to access the for-profit infor-
mation reseller services, and thus may be at a competitive disadvantage. Making sure that the entire
market has access to the same information could foster fairer competition.").
48. AI-Fayed v. CIA, No. Civ.A. 00-2092 (CKK), 2000 WL 34342564, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 20,
2000) (quoting 142 CONG. REc. 10,714 (1996)), aff'd, 254 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
49. Herz, supra note 12, at 588 (providing examples of the lack of material in reading rooms).
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still views the request-and-response model as the centerpiece of
FOIA.50
Professor Jennifer Shkabatur elaborated:
[E]ven though E-FOIA was intended to be easily implemented, agen-
cies have "by and large failed to comply with E-FOIA's affirmative
disclosure mandate." A survey conducted ten years after E-FOIA came
into force found "massive non-compliance" among 149 administrative
agencies. Only twenty-one percent of the surveyed agencies had on
their websites all four categories of records (even if only partially), and
more than forty percent of agencies had not posted even one frequently
requested record.5 1
A result of this largescale disregard of the mandate, Professor Vla-
deck concluded, is "a significant and growing dissonance between the
promises made by our federal right-to-know laws and their perfor-
mance."52
An illustrative example of the failure to comply with the affirmative
disclosure mandate is what has come to be known as the USDA black-
out-the USDA's deletion from its website in early 2017 of thousands of
records related to the enforcement of the AWA.
53
II. CASE STUDY: AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURES AND THE ANIMAL
WELFARE ACT
This Part discusses compliance with the affirmative disclosure man-
date in the context of the administration of one particular statute-the fed-
eral AWA, 54 our nation's most significant animal protection law. Primarily
intended "to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or
for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and
treatment,"5 5 the AWA regulates more than 2.5 million animals at nearly
11,000 locations across the United States.
56
50. Kwoka, supra note 47, at 1430 (footnotes omitted).
51. Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the
United States, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 79, 99 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Vladeck,
supra note 4, at 1789; then quoting NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE, FILE NOT FOUND: 10 YEARS AFTER
E-FOIA, MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE DELINQUENT 1 (2007)).
52. Vladeck, supra note 4.
53. See infra Section II.B.
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2012).
55. Id. § 2131(1).
56. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2018 PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET 20-49, 20-139 (2018), https://www.obpa.usda.gov/20aphisexnotes20l8.pdf For more de-
tailed information about the AWA, including some of the implementation and enforcement issues that
have plagued the statute, see generally Delcianna J. Winders, Administrative License Renewal andDue
Process-A Case Study, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfin?abstract id=2952062 [hereinafter Administrative License Renewal], and Delcianna J. Wind-
ers, Administrative Law Enforcement, Warnings, and Transparency, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 452 (2018).
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The AWA has always generated particularly strong public interest.57
When it was enacted in the mid-sixties, Congress received more mail
about animal welfare than civil rights and the Vietnam War combined.
The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, recognized the role of the public in AWA
implementation, noting that "the AWA anticipated the continued monitor-
ing of concerned animal lovers to ensure that the purposes of the Act were
honored."59 And Senator Robert Dole, in sponsoring critical amendments
to the AWA, explained that it aims "to ensure the public that adequate
safeguards are in place to prevent unnecessary abuses to animals, and that
everything possible is being done to decrease the pain of animals during
experimentation and testing."6 0
Despite enduring strong public interest, the AWA has been plagued
by longstanding enforcement problems.6 1 For decades the USDA's own
Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued audit after audit condemning
the Agency's enforcement of the AWA.62 A 2014 audit, for example,
found that the Agency did not follow its own criteria in closing dozens of
cases involving animal deaths or other grave or repeat welfare violations,
severely reduced and under-assessed penalties, and failed to ensure that
experimental procedures on animals were adequately monitored, putting
animals at risk.63 A 2010 audit found that AWA enforcement was "inef-
fective" and penalties for violators were inappropriately reduced. A 2005
audit found that the USDA "was not aggressively pursuing enforcement
actions against violators of AWA and was assessing minimal monetary
penalties . .. making penalties basically meaningless."65 As a result, as the
OIG found, violators considered the penalties "as a normal cost of busi-
ness, rather than a deterrent for violating the law." 66 The OIG has also
57. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
58. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 1966-1996: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, at vii (Michael Kreger et al. eds., 1998), https://ar-
chive.org/stream/CAT10860535/CATIO860535_djvu.txt. Similarly, a 1966 Life magazine article on
conditions at dog dealer facilities generated more letters to the magazine than any of its stories on
Vietnam or civil rights. Christine Stevens, Laboratory Animal Welfare, in ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL
RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641 TO 1990, at 66, 74 (4th ed. 1990).
59. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
60. 131 CONG. REC. 29,155 (1985) (statement of Sen. Dole).
61. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
62. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE OVERSIGHT OF RESEARCH FACILITIES AUDIT NO. 33601-0001-41, at 1-3 (2014)
(summarizing the series of audits).
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM INSPECTIONS OF PROBLEMATIC DEALERS AUDIT No.
33002-4-SF, at 30 (2010)).
65. Id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AUDIT.
No. 33002-3-SF, at 10 (2005)).
66. Id; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT AUDIT NO.
33600-1-CH, at 13-16 (1995) (finding that the USDA had failed to fully address problems identified
in a prior audit and needed "to take stronger enforcement actions to correct serious or repeat violations
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criticized the USDA for automatically renewing the licenses of chronic
violators, and the Agency has also faced litigation over this practice.67
A review of USDA funding requests also indicate a history of apathy
toward the AWA, with the Agency in some years even inexplicably reduc-
ing the amount of its congressional appropriations requests for AWA en-
forcement by millions of dollars.6 8 Indeed, even the Senate Appropriates
Committee has expressed concern over "reports that the inadequate en-
forcement of animal welfare regulations has led to repeat violations and
continuing mistreatment of animals."69
In addition, as the New York City Bar Association has noted: "[D]oc-
umented complaints by private parties and animal protection organizations
,,70
regarding the USDA's failure to enforce the Act are legion ....
In light of this well documented history of both strong public interest
in the law and chronic regulatory failure, transparency is especially im-
portant. The central purpose of FOIA, as recognized by the Supreme
Court, is "to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."
71 As the
D.C. Circuit has elaborated: "FOIA's core purpose is to shed light on the
operation of government. This purpose is effectuated by 'facilitat[ing]
public access to Government documents, and by 'pierc[ing] the veil of ad-
ministrative secrecy and [] open[ing] agency action to the light of public
scrutiny.
In short, transparency-and compliance with FOIA, including the af-
firmative disclosure mandate-are of particular interest in the context of
the AWA.
of [the AWA]" and that regulated entities had little incentive to comply with the AWA because mon-
etary penalties were, in some cases, arbitrarily reduced and often so low that violators regarded them
as a cost of doing business); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CONTROLS OVER
APHIS LICENSING OF ANIMAL EXHIBITORS AuDrr NO. 33601 -10-CH at 1 (2010) (calling on USDA
officials "to strengthen their inspection processes to ensure that licensed exhibitors comply with safety
requirements for exhibiting dangerous animals"); Report ofthe Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining
to Animals of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Regarding Its Recommendation to
Amend the Animal Welfare Act, 9 ANIMAL L. 345, 347-48 (2003) [hereinafter Report of the Commit-
tee] (discussing these and other OIG audit reports).
67. See generally Administrative License Renewal, supra note 56.
68. Report of the Committee, supra note 66, at 348-49.
69. Id. at 349 (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-41, at 58 (2001)).
70. Id. at 347 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for Animals
(with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1366 (2000)); see Carole Lynn Nowicki, The
Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 443, 463-77 (1999) (providing
a discussion about the failings of the AWA); Valerie Stanley, The Animal Welfare Act and USDA:
Time for an Overhaul, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 103 (1998) (discussing the AWA and the Animal
Legal Defense Fund's legal actions); Katherine M. Swanson, Carte Blanche for Cruelty: The Non-En-
forcement of the Animal Welfare Act, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 937, 937 (2002) (discussing the lack
of enforcement of the AWA); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp 44,48-51
(D.D.C. 1996).
71. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772
(1989) (quoting Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
72. Lurie v. Dep't of Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 32 (D.D.C. 1997) (citations omitted) (quoting
Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)).
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A. The USDA's History of Compliance with the Affirmative Disclosure
Mandate in Implementing the A WA
In 2000, the USDA promulgated regulations pursuant to the EFOIA
amendments, including a regulation that provides that "[i]n accordance
with 5 U.S.C. [§] 552(a)(2)," agencies shall make publicly available
"[c]opies of all records, regardless of form or format, which have been
released pursuant to a FOIA request under 5 U.S.C. [§] 552(a)(3), and
which because of the nature of their subject matter, have become or are
likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the
same records."7 3 The regulation proceeds to specify factors for determin-
ing whether records are likely to fall under this category:
(i) Previous experience with similar records;
(ii) The particular characteristics of the records involved, including
their nature and the type of information contained in them; and
(iii) The identity and number of requesters and whether there is wide-
spread media, historical, academic, or commercial interest in the rec-
ords.74
Consistent with the EFOIA amendments, the regulation also requires
that agencies make available "[a] general index of the records."
Three key categories of documents are generated in the course of im-
plementing the AWA that have received particular public interest and that
the USDA has repeatedly recognized qualify as records that have been and
are likely to be frequently requested: inspection reports, annual reports,
and enforcement records.76
73. USDA FOIA Regulations, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 46335, 46337 (July 28, 2000) (codified
at 7 C.F.R. § 1.4(a)(4) (2018)).
74. 7 C.F.R. § 1.4(a)(4)(i)-(iii).
75. Id. § 1.4(a)(5). Notably the USDA recently proposed amendments to its FOIA regula-
tions that would do away with these detailed requirements for frequently requested records and would
instead much more generally require that "[c]omponents within the USDA maintain public reading
rooms containing the records that the FOIA requires to be made regularly available for public inspec-
tion in an electronic format. Each component is responsible for determining which of the records it
generates are required to be made available in its respective public reading room." USDA FOIA Reg-
ulations, Proposed Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 26865, 26866 (June 11, 2018).
76. See infra notes 92, 96, 99, 101-02 and accompanying text.
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Under the AWA, regulated entities-researchers, exhibitors, breed-
ers, dealers, and transporters-are subject to routine, unannounced inspec-
tions by the USDA. 7 7 Each time such an inspection is conducted, an in-
spection report is generated.8 The inspection report documents failures to
comply with minimum animal welfare standards.
79
Annual reports are records that the AWA requires research facilities
to complete and submit to the USDA.8 0 These reports document the num-
ber and types of animals used for research and, importantly, of those sub-
jected to pain and distress, including without painkillers or other relief.
8'
Research facilities must also include an explanation of why unalleviated
pain or distress was considered necessary.
82 These reports also must iden-
83
tify and explain certain departures from the minimum welfare standards.8
Enforcement records reflect the final action where the Agency be-
lieves that action to address violations is warranted.
84 Enforcement records
include warnings, settlement agreements (sometimes referred to as "stip-
ulations"), administrative complaints, and administrative law judge deter-
minations. 85
As early as 1997, the USDA provided access to summary data from
AWA inspection reports on its EFOIA web page.8 6 In September 2001, the
Agency began posting full inspection reports " and acknowledged that it
77. 7 U.S.C. § 2147 (2012); AWA Inspection and Annual Reports, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC.: ANIMAL
PLANT INSPECTION SERV., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa-awa/awa-
inspection-and-annual-reports (last modified Aug. 18, 2017).
78. See USDA, ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE 2-4 (May 2018),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/Animal-Care-Inspection-Guide.pdf
79. See id. Notably, in 2015, reportedly in response to "outrage" by dog breeders "over the fact
that a growing coalition of municipalities and states were passing laws limiting the number of viola-
tions a breeder could have on his inspection reports and still sell to local pet shops," RORY KRESS, THE
DOGGIE IN THE WINDOW: How ONE DOG LED ME FROM THE PET STORE TO THE FACTORY FARM TO
UNCOVER THE TRUTH OF WHERE PUPPIES REALLY COME FROM 58 (2018), the USDA began omitting
certain violations from the inspection reports and instead documenting them on separate, not publicly
available "teachable moment" forms. Id.; APHIS, USDA Animal Care Revises Its Animal Welfare
Inspection Guide, USDA (Jan. 14, 2016), https://content.govdelivery.com/ac-
counts/USDAAPHIS/bulletins/1 3044a6.
80. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(7); 9 C.F.R. § 2.36 (2018).
81. 9 C.F.R. § 2.36(b)(5)-(7).
82. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(7)(B)(iii); 9 C.F.R. § 2.36(b)(7).
83. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(E); 9 C.F.R. § 2.36(b)(3).
84. See APHIS, Animal Welfare Act Enforcement, USDA,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/sa awa/ct-awa-enforcements (last modi-
fied Feb. 3, 2017).
85. See APHIS, Animal Care Enforcement Summary (AWA and HPA), USDA,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/business-services/ies/ies per-formance_metrics/ies-
ac enforcement summary (last modified July 17, 2018).
86. Memorandum from Chester Gipson, Deputy Adm'r, Animal Care, APHIS, to Kenneth Co-
hen, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Gen. Law Div., Office of the Gen. Counsel, USDA (Apr. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Chester Gipson] (on file with author); see also ANIMAL & PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE ANIMAL CARE
PROGRAM (2000), http://www.catbox.com/usda/strategic.html [hereinafter STRATEGIC DIRECTION
FOR THE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM] (noting "previous E-FOIA posting of inspection results" that in-
cluded "counts of the noncompliant and corrected items").
87. Memorandum from Chester Gipson, supra note 86.
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was doing so pursuant to EFOIA's affirmative disclosure mandate.8 An-
nual reports were also being posted online by this point.8 9 On March 6,
2002, in the midst of post-9/1 1 heightened national security concerns, the
records were removed from the website at the direction of the Department
of Homeland Security.90 However, the records were subsequently re-
stored.9 1
In a March 2004 memo, the USDA acknowledged that AWA "in-
spection and annual reports . . . qualify as records subject to multiple re-
quests under EFOIA and must be made available to the pubic via elec-
tronic means."92 By March 2009, the USDA was routinely posting AWA
inspection reports online9 3 and experienced a thirty-five percent reduction
in incoming FOIA requests as a result.94 During this same time period,
APHIS also began posting annual reports, noting that they "are of tremen-
dous interest to our animal welfare community."95 The Agency also began
proactively posting all "Investigative and Enforcement Services enforce-
ment actions, and copies of all redacted FOIA responses."96 The Agency
has also acknowledged that enforcement records are frequently requested
and thus subject to the affirmative disclosure mandate. For example, in
response to a reporter's FOIA request for enforcement records, the Agency
stated that such records "are frequently requested and, as a result, APHIS,
88. Id. ("Prior to September 11,2001, AC and FOIA determined that AC inspection reports and
annual reports qualified as 'reading room' records because of the continuing high interest from animal
groups and the general public."); see also Complaint of Petitioner at ¶¶ 17-18, Humane Soc'y of the
U.S. v. U.S. Dep't. of Agric., No. 1:05-CV-00197, 2005 WL 1173393, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2005);
Karl Field et al., Electronic Freedom ofInformation: Challenges Facing the Regulators and the Reg-
ulated, LAB ANIMAL, June 2003, at 43-45 ("On 21 October 2001, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Animal Care (APHIS, AC) complied with the 'reading room' provision by posting 'frequently
requested documents' to their internet website."); Soc'y ofToxicology, Watching Washington: Annual
A WA Report Signature No Longer Posted by USDA, CoMMuNIU, Summer/Fall 2006, at 15.
89. Memorandum from Chester Gipson, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Soc'y of Toxicology, supra note 88, at 3.
92. Memorandum from Kenneth E. Cohen, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Gen. Law Div., Office of
Gen. Counsel, USDA, to Chester A. Gipson, Deputy Adm'r, Animal Care, APHIS, & Michael S.
Marquis, Assistant Dir. for Freedom of Info., Legislative and Pub. Affairs, APHIS (Mar. 12, 2004).
93. ANIMAL AND PLANT INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CHIEF FOIA OFFICER





96. ANIMAL AND PLANT INSPECTION SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CHIEF FOIA OFFICER
REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 21 (2010), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/foia/down-
loads/Chiei/o20Officer/o20Re-
ports/APHIS%20201 0%20APHIS%2OChief/2OFOIA%200fficer/2oReport.pdf [hereinafter 2010
FOIA REPORT TO THE DOJ].
97. See Letter from Tonya Woods, Dir., Freedom of Info. & Privacy Act, Legislative & Pub.
Affairs, APHIS, to James Shiffer, Star Tribune (Jan. 23, 2015).
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in compliance with the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amend-
ments of 1996, made the determination to provide the requested records
on its agency website."98
As anticipated-indeed intended-by the EFOIA amendments, these
proactive disclosures "resulted in a significant reduction in the number of
incoming FOIA requests-525 fewer requests between FY 2009 and FY
2010, or approximately a 42% reduction in the number of requests re-
ceived."99 The Agency noted: "In FY 2010-through a combination of ef-
forts, APHIS reduced the Agency's overall backlog of FOIA requests by
almost 43%-unprecedented in more than a 10-year backlog and far ex-
ceeding our 25% goal for the year."100
The Agency repeatedly made clear that these postings were being
made pursuant to the EFOIA amendments because they were frequently
requested records.10 ' For example, a May 2009 Agency memo noted, "For
the past several years, inspection reports have been the most frequently
requested document from APHIS with approximately 850 requests ful-
filled each year."l0 2 A June 2009 memo touted compliance with EFOIA's
affirmative mandates as something that would "not only aid increased un-
derstanding" by the public but also "decrease the number of FOIA re-
quests, give the public convenient, instant access to pertinent records, and
create informed citizens."1 0 3 Echoing the legislative history of the EFOIA
98. Id.
99. 2010 FOIA REPORT TO THE DOJ, supra note 96, at 21.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM, supra note 86 ("The
previous E-FOIA posting of inspection results did not provide descriptions of specific violations, only
counts of the noncompliant and corrected items. While seeking to comply with the provisions of
E-FOIA, AC wants to ensure that publicly released information fairly portrays inspection results
through full implementation of the new inspection data base." (emphases added)); CHESTER GIBSON,
ELECTRONIC POSTING OF INSPECTION REPORTS FOR RESEARCH, FEDERAL, AND VETERAN'S
ADMINISTRATION FACILITIES (2009), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal welfare/downloads/stake-
holder/stakeholder1 1022009.pdf ("APHIS Animal Care receives an average of 715 FOIA requests
each year, and these Class R inspection reports have been among the most frequently requested docu-
ments."); Field et al., supra note 88 ("On 21 October 2001, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser-
vice, Animal Care (APHIS, AC) complied with the 'reading room' provision by posting 'frequently
requested documents' to their internet website."); Soc'y of Toxicology, supra note 88 ("USDA first
began posting such reports on October 1, 2001 as part of its compliance with the Electronic Freedom
of Information Act (E-FOIA) Amendments."); Letter from Chester Gipson, Deputy Adm'r, Animal
Care, APHIS (May 18, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from Chester Gipson] ("For the past several years,
inspection reports have been the most frequently requested document from APHIS with approximately
850 requests fulfilled each year."); Enclosure to Letter from Kevin Shea, Acting Adm'r, & Bill Clay,
Acting Assoc. Adm'r, APHIS, USDA (June 19, 2009), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/foia/down-
loads/APHIS%2OCommittment%/o2Oto%20Transparency.pdf [hereinafter Enclosure to Letter from
Kevin Shea] (Facility inspection reports "were the most frequently requested APHIS records under
FOIA and making them available on our Web site will go a long way toward informing the public of
our commitment to animal welfare, while also supporting our FOIA backlog reduction ef-
forts. . .. APHIS will continue to increase its compliance with the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act (E-FOIA) and post current documents to the APHIS E-FOIA reading room.").
102. Letter from Chester Gipson, supra note 101.
103. Enclosure to Letter from Kevin Shea, supra note 101.
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amendments, the memo underscored: "The goal of E-FOIA is to make in-
formation publicly available online so that FOIA requests become an ave-
nue of last resort." 04 A few months later another memo reiterated that in-
spection reports were "among the most frequently requested docu-
ments."05
B. The USDA Blackout
Despite having the USDA repeatedly touted its posting of this infor-
mation as required by the EFOIA amendments, in the public interest, and
highly conducive for reducing FOIA backlogs,106 on February 3, 2017, the
USDA suddenly, and with very little explanation, removed all three of
these categories of records from its website. The Agency explained its
move with the following rather Orwellian statement: "Based on our com-
mitment to being transparent, remaining responsive to our stakeholders'
informational needs, and maintaining the privacy rights of individuals,
APHIS is implementing actions to remove documents .... 07 The real
reasons for the deletion remain unclear. As of the date of this Article, de-
spite the passage of a year and a half since a FOIA request for records
about the decision to remove the documents was granted expedited treat-
ment, the Agency has not released any information. Nor has it otherwise
proffered much in the way of further explanation.
The Association of Zoos and Aquariums, the United States' leading
accrediting body for zoos, promptly registered its disagreement with the
removal of records, noting: "Public disclosure of relevant animal care and
welfare information represents our license to operate and is essential for
ensuring the public's trust and confidence in our profession, enabling the
public to distinguish the best animal care facilities from poorly run breed-
ing farms and roadside zoos and menageries."'0 8 Petland, one of the na-
tion's largest retail suppliers of dogs, and Speaking of Research, a group
that defends animal research, raised similar concerns.109
104. Id.
105. CHESTER GIBSON, supra note 101; see also 2009 PowerPoint presentation (on file with au-
thor) (Inspection Reports were posted online as "[r]equired by EFOIA Amendments to Freedom of
Information Act").
106. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
107. ANIMAL AND PLANT INSPECTION SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL WELFARE
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/enforce-
mentactions.
108. Nation's Best Zoos and Aquariums Disagree with Decision to Remove Online Access to
USDA Inspection Reports, ASS'N ZOOS & AQUARIUMS (Feb. 6,2017), https://www.aza.org/aza-news-
releases/posts/nations-best-zoos-and-aquariums-disagree-with-decision-to-remove-online-access-to-
usda-inspection-re.
109. See Petland Reacts to USDA Decision, PETLAND (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.pet-
land.com/news/2017-2-6b.htm; The USDA 's Removal ofInformation About Animal Research Is a Step







Congress also entered the fray. Eighteen Senators sent a letter to the
USDA condemning the blackout and, the following day, more than 100
Representatives from both sides of the aisle sent a similar letter to Presi-
dent Trump." 0 The House and Senate have both introduced legislation to
require reposting of the records."'
Regardless of the reasons underlying the removal of the records from
the APHIS's website, the record makes clear that had the highly predicta-
ble consequence of significantly increasing the Agency's FOIA request
backlog and response times-precisely the things that EFOIA's affirma-
tive disclosure mandate sought to mitigate.112 An analysis by the author of
APHIS's FOIA logs, which were obtained pursuant to a FOIA request,
reveals that from February 3, 2017-the date the records removed from
the website-and May 15-the date through which logs were pro-
vided' 13-the Agency received 751 FOIA requests, more than double the
number for that same time period in the preceding year.
1 14 Moreover, more
than seventy percent of these requests were at least in part-and often in
full-for records that, prior to February 3, 2017, had been available
online.115 As of August 9, 2017, APHIS's FOIA backlog had increased to
1,596 open requests, more than 2.5 times what it was the month preceding
the blackout."16
The blackout provides an excellent opportunity to observe the impact
of affirmative disclosures in action. Even before the blackout APHIS was
slow to process FOIA requests.l17 According to the USDA's most recent
annual FOIA report to Congress, as of last year it could take more than
two years to process a "simple" FOIA request, more than three years for a
110. See Letter from Earl Blumenauer et al., U.S. Representatives, to Donald J. Trump, U.S.
President (Feb. 14, 2017), https://blumenauer.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/blumenauer-
calls-donald-trump-restore-vital-animal-welfare-data-online.
111. See Animal Welfare Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R. 1368, 115th Cong. (2017).
112. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
113. Although historically APHIS has routinely posted its FOIA logs online, beginning in 2017
the Agency stopped routine, timely postings. See FOIA Logs, U.S. DEP'T. AGRIC.: ANIMAL PLANT
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/resources/foia/CT FOIA_Logs (last
modified July 27, 2018).
114. U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2016, at 6 (2016), https://www.dm.usda.gov/foia/docs/USDA FY16 Final.docx [hereinafter
FOIA REPORT FOR 2016] (noting 1143 APHIS FOIA requests received in 2016 compared to 514 re-
quests pending at the beginning of the 2016 fiscal year); see FOIA Logs,supra note 113.
115. See FOIA Logs,supra note 113.
116. Karin Brulliard, People Who Care About Animal Welfare Are Demanding Information from
USDA, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ani-
malia/wp/2017/08/1 0/people-who-care-about-animal-welfare-are-demanding-information-from-
usda/?noredirect-on&utm term=.d6d3 I dc62e I e; see FOlA REPORT FOR 2016, supra note 114 (noting
649 requests pending at the beginning of the 2017 fiscal year).
117. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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"complex" request, and more than five months even for an "expedited"
request. 18
III. LITIGATING THE AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE MANDATES-NO
RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY
This Part discusses litigation efforts to hold agencies-including the
USDA-accountable for complying with the affirmative disclosure man-
date.
A. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior"': The
D.C. Circuit Holds That It Cannot Compel Publication in the Federal
Register Under FOIA
The first major case seeking to compel disclosure pursuant to an af-
firmative disclosure mandate was filed before the 1996 EFOIA amend-
ments.120 The plaintiff, Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation, sought an or-
der requiring publication in the Federal Register of a Department of Inte-
rior regulation.121 Kennecott argued that the regulation was a "substantive
rule of general applicability" that was "adopted as authorized by law," and
as such was subject to an affirmative disclosure mandate.122
"The district court rejected Kennecott's Freedom of Information Act
claim, ruling that because the Act did not authorize it to order the relief
Kennecott requested-publication of the 1993 Document in the Federal
Register-it lacked jurisdiction." 2 3 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.12 4
Looking at the language of FOIA's judicial review provision,
§ 552(a)(4)(B), which authorizes district courts "to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency rec-
ords improperly withheld from the complainant," 2 5 the D.C. Circuit
agreed that the district court lacked authority "to order publication of such
documents."'26
The Court explained:
While it might seem strange for Congress to command agencies
to "currently publish" or "promptly publish" documents, without in the
118. U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2017, at7-8 (2017). Already the agency has more than tripled this time frame in the context of
the author's expedited request for records about the decision to remove records from APHIS's website.
119. 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1199, 1201.
122. Id. at 1202; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012) (requiring proactive disclosure of "substan-
tive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency" in addition to the
above-discussed isclosure of frequently requested records).
123. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1202.
124. Id.
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
126. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1202.
2018] 927
DENVER LAW REVIEW
same statute providing courts with power to order publication, we
think that is exactly what Congress intended. . . . The question, then,
is whether Congress intended "production" to include "publication."
The dictionary does not resolve the matter. "Production" could mean
either providing the document to an individual or broadcasting it to the
broader public. Nor is this a situation where only one interpretation
comports with the statute's purpose. The statute imposes "a general
obligation on the agency to make information available to the public,"
an obligation that could be fulfilled either by handing the document
127
over to an individual or by publishing it in the Federal Register.
To resolve the ambiguity in the government's favor, the court focused
on two factors. First, the court found support in its reading of
§ 552(a)(4)(B) as providing relief to individuals:
We think it significant . . . that § 552(a)(4)(B) is aimed at relieving the
injury suffered by the individual complainant, not by the general pub-
lic. It allows district courts to order "the production of any agency rec-
ords improperly withheld from the complainant," not agency records
withheld from the public. Providing documents to the individual fully
relieves whatever informational injury may have been suffered by that
particular complainant; ordering publication goes well beyond that
need.128
Importantly, the court also stressed that:
Congress has provided an alternative means for encouraging agencies
to fulfill their obligation to publish materials in the Federal Register.
As amended in 1974, § 552(a)(1) protects a person from being "ad-
versely affected by" a regulation required to be published in the Fed-
eral Register unless an agency either published the regulation or the
person had actual and timely notice of it. This gives agencies a power-
129
ful incentive to publish any rules they expect to enforce.
It is important to underscore that this alternative compliance incen-
tive played a significant factor in the court's conclusion.1 30 Importantly,
there is no similar mechanism in place to motivate compliance with the
requirement to post frequently requested records.
It is also worth noting that the Kennecott decision focuses the entirety
of its analysis on the courts' authority to "order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant," while giving
no attention whatsoever to the broad, separate, disjunctive authorization to
courts "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records."]
31 As dis-
127. Id. at 1202-03 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) (citations omit-
ted)).
128. Id. at 1203 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
129. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1202.
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cussed in Part IV below, basic canons of construction require that this sep-
arate clause be given independent meaning, separate from the mandate for
ordering disclosure.
B. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice l32. The D.C. Circuit Expands Kennecott
In Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, the plaintiff, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington (CREW), sought public posting of opinions issued by the De-
partment of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel pursuant to FOIA's affirm-
ative disclosure mandates.13 3 Specifically, CREW contended that these
opinions were "final opinions . .. made in the adjudication of cases" and
"statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agency and are not published in the Federal Register," both of which FOIA
requires to be made publicly available.13 4
Notably, like Kennecott, CREW involved what Professor Herz has
referred to as mandates for disclosures of law, rather than disclosures of
information,135 and, like the material at issue in Kennecott, the material at
issue in CREW also had in place a separate compliance incentive.136 Thus,
just as "Congress has provided an alternative means for encouraging agen-
cies to fulfill their obligation to publish materials in the Federal Regis-
ter . . . [by] protect[ing] a person from being 'adversely affected by' a
regulation required to be published in the Federal Register unless an
agency either published the regulation or the person had actual and timely
notice of it,"137 Congress likewise provided that:
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff man-
ual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on,
used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an
agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as pro-
vided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.138
CREW sought relief in the form of, inter alia, "an order requiring
'[D]efendants to make all final opinions made in the adjudication of cases
and statements of policy and interpretations available for public inspection
132. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (CREW), 164 F. Supp.
3d 145 (D.D.C. 2016), affd, 846 F.3d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
133. Id. at 147.
134. Id. at 147-48 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)-(B)).
135. See Herz, supra note 12, at 586.
136. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
137. Kennecou, 88 F.3d at 1203 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E).
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and copying, including on an ongoing basis, and without a specific request
for any specific opinion or category of opinion."'l
39
Because, in CREW's view, Kennecott foreclosed the possibility of
such relief under FOIA directly, it filed suit under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA). 14 0 Judicial review is available under the APA only
where there is no other judicial remedy available.141
The district court held that the FOIA's judicial review provision au-
thorized a suit to enforce FOIA's affirmative disclosure mandates and that
accordingly an APA claim was not available and dismissed the case.142
Characterizing the case as one to "enforce disclosure" and a challenge to
"the withholding of records," the district court held that it fell within the
scope of Section 552(a)(4)(B).143
With regard to the question of the adequacy of relief available under
FOIA, the district court noted CREW's position that the only relief avail-
able under FOIA "is compelled disclosure of records specifically re-
quested by and withheld from a FOIA requester," and not continuous, af-
firmative, proactive disclosure.144 Although the Department of Justice
agreed that this was indeed the full scope of available relief under FOIA,
the district court expressed strong skepticism:
The court is far from convinced that the parties are correct about
the limited extent of the court's remedial authority under FOIA. The
statute itself provides district courts with the authority "to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production
of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant."
The statute's use of the conjunctive "and" suggests that district courts
have the power to issue injunctive relief beyond merely compelling
disclosure of records. That conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme
Court's observation that "[tlhe broad language of the FOIA, with its
obvious emphasis on disclosure and with its exemptions carefully de-
lineated as exceptions; the truism that Congress knows how to deprive
a court of broad equitable power when it chooses so to do . . ; and the
fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the District Court the en-
forcement arm of the statute," offers "little to suggest .. . that Congress
sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court." The Court of
Appeals has echoed the same: "FOIA im. oses no limits on courts' eq-
uitable powers in enforcing its terms."
14
139. CREW, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (quoting Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief at 13, Citizens, 164 F. Supp. 3d 145).
140. Id.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
142. CREW, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 154.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 155 (citations omitted) (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); then quoting Renegoti-
ation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1974); and then quoting Payne Enters., Inc.
v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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The court did not, however, resolve this question, noting that, regard-
less of the scope of relief available, APA review was precluded under the
case law. 46
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed.147 Despite acknowledging that
FOIA "vests courts with broad equitable authority" and the "the wide lat-
itude courts possess to fashion remedies under FOIA, including the power
to issue prospective injunctive relief," 48 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless held
that judicial authority stopped short of the ability to order that records be
made available for public inspection.149 Relying entirely on its prior deci-
sion in Kennecott, the court held that CREW could "seek an injunction
that would (1) apply prospectively, and would (2) impose an affirmative
obligation to disclose upon OLC, but that would (3) require disclosure of
documents and indices only to CREW, not disclosure to the public."150
C. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. 51 : Northern District
of California Adopts CREW
In a case following the USDA's deletion of AWA-related records
from its website, the courts had an opportunity to assess the scope of judi-
cial relief available in the context of a disclosure mandate for information
beyond law-i.e., for information that is required to be posted because it
is frequently requested pursuant to § 552(a)(2)(D).1 52 Shortly after the Feb-
ruary 2017 removal of records, a coalition of animal protection groups, led
by the Animal Legal Defense Fund and represented by Professor Kwoka,
filed suit against the USDA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. 153
Unconstrained by the D.C. Circuit's precedent, the plaintiffs filed
claims under both the APA and FOIA, "seeking to compel publication of
the [previously-available APHIS] documents.
Despite not being bound by the D.C. Circuit's precedent but relying
entirely on Kennecott and CREW, the court held that
federal courts do not have the power to order agencies to make docu-
ments available for public inspection under [S]ection 552(a)(4)(B) of
FOIA. While plaintiffs may bring suit to enforce [S]ection 552(a)(2)
and may seek injunctive relief and production of documents to them
146. Id.
147. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 846 F.3d 1235, 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
148. Id. at 1241-42.
149. Id. at 1243.
150. Id. at 1244.
151. No. 17-CV-00949-WHO, 2017 WL 3478848 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), appealfiled, Ani-
mal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep't ofAgric., No. 17-16858 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017).
152. See id.




personally, they cannot compel an agency to make documents availa-
ble to the general public. 155
The court likewise adopted the CREWcourt's decision as to the avail-
ability of an APA claim, holding that "because FOIA provides an adequate
alternative remedy," plaintiffs cannot sustain their alternative claim under
the APA.16
To date, the courts that have considered the question of whether the
broad public access that Congress mandated under FOIA's affirmative dis-
closure provisions can be judicially ordered have consistently ruled in the
negative. The next, and final, Part of this Article argues that these courts
have gotten it wrong-that for both legal and policy reasons FOIA should
be read to allow such relief.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD: GIVING TEETH TO THE AFFIRMATIVE
DISCLOSURE MANDATE
As a preliminary matter, there is no legal reason that the D.C. Circuit
in Kennecott was required to resolve what it admitted was an ambiguity in
FOIA's judicial review provision in favor of more limited review. Again,
that provision affords the district courts "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.""' As the
Kennecott court acknowledged, whether "production" includes "publica-
tion" could not be resolved by plain language or dictionary definitions and
[p]roduction' could mean either providing the document to an individual
or broadcasting it to the broader public."
5 Moreover, the Kennecott court
provided no analysis whatsoever of the separate authority, apart from or-
dering the production of records, to enjoin the withholding of records. In
short, there is a clear statutory basis for authorizing publication of records
that an agency has failed to disclose in accordance with the affirmative
disclosure mandate.
Moreover, given the broad remedial purposes of FOIA, the strong
public interest at the core of the statute, and the recognized breadth of in-
junctive authority under the statute, it makes sense to read it this way.
155. Id. at *6.
156. Id. at *2.
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(B) (2012).




The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, "[t]he mandate of
FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records," 5 9 and the legis-
lative history of the affirmative disclosure requirements makes clear that
they were crafted precisely to fulfill this mandate.160
And, specifically discussing the scope of injunctive relief available
under FOIA, the Supreme Court has stressed:
The broad language of the FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on
disclosure and with its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions;
the truism that Congress knows how to deprive a court of broad equi-
table power when it chooses so to do, and the fact that the Act, to a
definite degree, makes the District Court the enforcement arm of the
[statute], persuade us that the ... principle of a statutorily prescribed
special and exclusive remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases. With
the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by
§ 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose,
that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court.161
Citing that Supreme Court decision, the D.C. Circuit has likewise un-
derscored that "[t]he FOIA imposes no limits on courts' equitable powers
in enforcing its terms."'62
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly recognized that FOIA au-
thorizes judicial review of challenge not just as to "specific request[s],"
but also of "an agency policy or practice" that impairs "lawful access to
information," including "in the future."' 63 As the court has explained:.
So long as an agency's refusal to supply information evidences a pol-
icy or practice of delayed disclosure or some other failure to abide by
the terms of the FOIA, and not merely isolated mistakes by agency
officials, a party's challenge to the policy or practice cannot be mooted
by the release of the specific documents that prompted the suit.164
The Kennecott court also noted that it opted to read FOIA narrowly
because "[p]roviding documents to the individual fully relieves whatever
159. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,
166 (1985)); accord Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 563 (2011) (quoting U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989)); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352, 352 n.7
(1982) ("The broad mandate of the FOIA is to provide for open disclosure of public information."
"This principle has been reiterated frequently by this Court.") (first citing Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Haw. / Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981); then citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978); and then citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
160. See Kwoka, supra note 47, at 1367-68.
161. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1974) (citations
omitted).
162. Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Bannercraft
Clothing Co., 415 U.S. at 19-20).
163. Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep't of the Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Payne, 837 F.2d at 491).
164. Payne, 837 F.2d at 491 (footnote omitted).
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informational injury may have been suffered by that particular complain-
ant; ordering publication goes well beyond that need."1 6
5 However, the
first point is not necessarily accurate; the second point, even if true, would
not necessarily cut in favor of narrow relief.
It is certainly conceivable that a particular plaintiff challenging non-
compliance with the affirmative disclosure mandate might be injured not
only by not having access themselves to information but also by the public
more broadly not having access. An organization that advocates on behalf
of consumers, for example, would not necessarily be made whole by pri-
vate disclosure, where its members sought public access. Likewise, an ad-
vocacy organization, or a scholar, may be uniquely injured even if they
privately have access to information by virtue of nonpublication if, for ex-
ample, their claims are rendered not independently verifiable by the gov-
ernment's compliance failures. Thus, it is not necessarily true that "order-
ing publication goes well beyond" relieving an informational injury.
And even if it were true, this is no legal basis for denying such relief.
Courts routinely grant relief that happens to benefit the public and not just
the individual plaintiff. Indeed, in certain contexts, such as antitrust, indi-
vidual litigants are seen as "efficient enforcers" who are "vindicat[ing] the
public interest." 66 And in the specific context of informational injury, the
Supreme Court has rejected the contention that a court is deprived of ju-
risdiction merely because the inability to access information is an injury
"shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."
16 7
At bottom, refusing to grant relief in the form of publication renders
virtually unenforceable an entire arm of FOIA-one that holds immense
promise of reducing the burdens on the public and agencies alike caused
by backlogs and delays.
There are also myriad policy reasons for the courts to specifically
order publication in cases involving violations of the affirmative disclo-
sure mandates. Doing so removes the need for multiple lawsuits over the
same records, saving agency and judicial resources. It also ameliorates
concerns about FOIA being coopted by profiteers seeking to hoard and sell
information, instead keeping it in the public domain.168
Most importantly, rendering EFOIA's affirmative disclosure man-
date enforceable holds immense promise for finally reducing agency back-
logs.
165. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1203 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
166. See, e.g., Gatt Commc'ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2013).
167. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 28,
Akins, 524 U.S. 11); see also id. at 25 ("[T]he fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress
of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.").




More than two decades after the EFOIA amendments were signed
into law to require agencies to proactively disclose frequently requested
records as a means of simultaneously reducing regulatory burden and en-
hancing public access to information, violations of the affirmative disclo-
sure mandate are unbridled. Unchecked violations of the mandate can be
attributed in large part to a series of cases erecting procedural roadblocks
not compelled by-and ultimately inconsistent with-FOIA. To address
these rampant violations, it is critical that courts revisit how they handle
these legal challenges. Specifically, pursuant to the Supreme Court's
recognition of the courts' broad equitable authority when reviewing FOIA
cases,169 courts resolving violations of EFOIA's affirmative disclosure
mandate must be willing to specifically order publication. Only then can
the promise of EFOIA's affirmative disclosure mandate be fulfilled.
169. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1974).
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